Category: Kelly 1978 - Wittenberg Door Campus Ministry

Mary and the Saints

8/14/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
8/14/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 18: Mary and the Saints" (pp. 490-499). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   The patristic period saw the start of veneration of the saints and of Mary (Kelly 1978, p. 490). Kelly is clear that this is only a beginning, but the developments of the patristic period set the stage for later growth. From an observation of the saint's day and the preservation of relics, the veneration grew to seeking help in prayer. The appeals to saints were based on the understanding that they were physically but not spiritually dead, and would possibly have a more direct channel to God in prayer (Kelly 1978, p. 491).
   The devotion to Mary developed more slowly than that to the martyrs (Kelly 1978, p. 491). However, she was always seen as an important figure in the implementation of God's salvation. By the late first and early second centuries, legends began to emerge, in which Mary did not suffer in childbirth, showed no signs of ever having been pregnant, and had been born in a miraculous way herself (Kelly 1978, p. 492). These were not uniformly accepted. A more productive line of consideration of Mary, pioneered by Justin, was the fact that she served as the antithesis to Eve (Kelly 1978, p. 493).
   After the Nicene council, Mary was considered more than she was earlier. Discussion of her role as "mother of God" as well as her virginity and the identity of Jesus' "brothers" flourished (Kelly 1978, p. 494). By the fifth century, Mary's reputation had grown significantly in the West (Kelly 1978, p. 496). As some eventually exalted her to the extreme of treading her like a goddess, others firmly rejected such exaltation, arguing that there is only one God in three persons, of whom Mary is not one (Kelly 1978, p. 498).

The Christian's Eternal Hope

8/7/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
8/7/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 17: The Christian Hope." (pp. 459-489). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly observes that from the earliest time Christians had attempted to understand the claim that Christ had fulfilled Israel's hope but that there was some sort of final fulfillment yet to come (Kelly 1978, p. 459). He briefly visits the concept, often purported in the scholarly community, that the eschatological hope from the apostolic age was replaced by a view of God's enduring kingdom on earth. Though second century authors show an interest in the ongoing earthly life, they do not abandon the earlier hope (Kelly 1978, p. 460).
   As with many doctrinal concepts, Kelly finds that the earliest Christians had views which could fit into categories but which were not fully articulated or interconnected. "Four chief moments dominate the eschatological expectation of early Christian theology - the return of Christ, known as the Parousia, the resurrection, the judgment, and the catastrophic ending of the present world-order" (Kelly 1978, p. 462).
   After about the middle of the second century, Kelly finds that Christian apologists and theologians begin expanding on the basic eschatological themes mentioned earlier (Kelly 1978, p. 465). The teachers felt it necessary to lay out reasons for their confessions of faith. Christianity was not the same as pagan philosophy or Gnostic thought. The apologists sought to make this distinction clear. The importance of the flesh and the bodily resurrection is a frequent emphasis (Kelly 1978, p. 467-468).
   In an important way, the eschatological hope of the Christian includes receiving "deification" (Kelly 1978, p. 469, his word). Participation in God's nature and immortality is part of every Chrsitian's future. In Tatian's view, this is part of being restored to the original state of humanity (Kelly 1978, p. 470). Origen took the resurrection as the point of restoration for fallen man (Kelly 1978, p. 472). In the end of the world he looked for a final and definitive judgment which will include God's wrath on all evil.
   The literal resurrection of the body remained central to eschatological hope among the later Latin and Greek Fathers (Kelly 1978, p. 474). Kelly does note a movement in opposition to Origen, critical of the "radical dualism" of the body and soul, and Origen's concept of the resurrection restoring "the 'bodily form', not the body as such" (Kelly 1978, p. 475). The difficulty which persisted through the period was that of 'form" versus the resurrection of the actual identical human body.
   The coming of the Lord for judgment, the parousia, precedes the resurrection. This was an important concept to the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries (Kelly 1978, p. 479). The literal interpretation of the Millennium tended to fall out of favor. A variety of allegorical explanations of the final events took the place of teaching a literal millennium. There was broad agreement that a literal judgment would eventually happen, but the timing of a millennial reign of Christ was not clear. The question of the soul's experience after death was a matter of uncertainty (Kelly 1978, p. 482). The time of judgment and the place of souls prior to the resurrection is unclear. The eternal punishment of the wicked was generally agreed upon. There was, however, a significant question as to whether the righteous suffer correction for their sins after death and before the final judgment (Kelly 1978, p. 484).
   The nature of the everlasting life in the world to come was a matter of some discussion. Origen saw it in terms of understanding mysteries and finally progressing to become pure reason (Kelly 1978, p. 485). The Cappadocial Fathers saw eternity in terms of blessed friendship with one another and God, contemplation of God, and a festal mood as we are perfected in the divine attributes (Kelly 1978, p. 486). Some, especially in the west, would discuss the "many mansions" of heaven as different rewards in accord with human merits (Kelly 1978, p. 487).

An Early Christian Concept of the Sacraments

7/31/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
7/31/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 16: The Later Doctrine of the Sacraments." (pp. 422-455). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   While the Christian sacraments, particularly of baptism and eucharist, have existed since the apostolic period, there were few attempts to systematize the theology by the fifth century (Kelly 1978, p. 422). They were understood as visible signs of an invisible grace. Yet the actual outworking of that grace was not described in substantial detail. There were, to add to the room for potential conflicts, additional actions which may or may not have been recognized as sacraments, such as confirmation and penance (Kelly 1978, p. 423). Augustine and others would confess that the efficacy of a sacrament was not related to the godliness of the person who administered it, but to the power of the Holy Spirit (Kelly 1978, pp. 424ff).
   Kelly observes that the concept of God's grace as the operative power in the sacrament, thus removing the one administering the sacrament from responsibility, could lead to the "so-called ex opere operata doctrine of sacraments, i.e., that they are signs which actually and automatically realize the grace they signify" (Kelly 1978, p. 427). In the East, the character of the one administering the sacraments could be considered to invalidate the sacrament, while this was a less likely opinion in the West.
   Kelly moves on to discuss baptism (Kelly 1978, pp. 428ff). Cyril of Jerusalem considered baptism as a regenerative bath in which past sins were washed away and the recipient is moved from sin to righteousness. This move to righteousness placed one on the path of sanctification, urging a change in life. This view was largely consistent with other Greek and Latin teachers during the fourth and fifth centuries (Kelly 1978, p. 429). Among those who considered children to be without sin, it became common to assert that baptism could seal the recipient for a future christian life (Kelly 1978, p. 430).
   The image of baptism as a seal of righteousness is common (Kelly 1978, pp. 430-431). Greek fathers by the fourth century spoke of the delivery of unity with God, including bearing the image and holiness of God (Kelly 1978, p. 432).
   The confirmation or chrismation, separated from baptism by the fourth and fifth centuries, receive Kelly's attention next. The rite was typically understood as a bestowal of the Holy Spirit (Kelly 1978, p. 433). A difficulty inherent is the separation of baptism and chrismation, since both impute the Holy Spirit (Kelly 1978, p. 435).
   Though baptism was typically understood as forgiving prior sins, the sacrament of penance came to serve as a means for receiving forgiveness of sins committed after baptism (Kelly 1978, p. 436). The interpretation of sins to which penance could be applied was a matter of contention, as some groups would appear more rigorous than others (Kelly 1978, p. 437). Kelly considers it important to recognize that historically penance could only be applied once in a person's lifetime (Kelly 1978, p. 439). It was a very serious matter. Private confession and absolution was known, and rejected in 589 by the third council of Toledo. Despite the rejection of private confession, we find evidence that at least some sins could be considered resolved without the steps of penance.
   The presence of Christ in the eucharist was articulated in two basic ways during the fourth and fifth centuries (Kelly 1978, p. 440). The figurative view, stressing the difference between the elements and the body and blood, was recognized and had significant historical claims to validity (Kelly 1978, p. 440). A new view, emphasizing a change of bread and wine into body and blood, came to more prominence in the fourth and fifth centuries. At the heart of the difficulty is the concurrent use of language and symbolism, of reality, of bread and body, of wine and blood (Kelly 1978, p. 441). Kelly takes the symbolic language used to consistently point to a real presence. When bread and wine are called symbols, it is assumed that body and blood are also present (Kelly 1978, p. 442). Not surprisingly, attempts to explain how the body and blood of Christ are present in the bread and wine were common, intricate, and varied.
   Kelly notes that in this time, the eucharist was considered as a sacrifice (Kelly 1978, p. 449). At the same time, it was seen as the way we are brought into union with Christ on a regular basis. The function of the "unbloody sacrifice" deserves evaluation. Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom both spoke in terms of our participation in the sacrifice of Christ, who is present before us (Kelly 1978, p. 451). Kelly notes that Chrysostom (In Hebr. hom. 13,I; 14.I.) says, "We do not offer a different sacrifice, but always the same one, or rather we accomplish the memorial of it" (Kelly 1978, p. 452). It is slightly unclear, based on Kelly's report of Chrysostom and others, whether the sacrifice is being (still) offered by Christ or by the celebrant. However, the idea of a sacrifice on the altar is clear, both in the east and the West (Kelly 1978, pp. 452-453).

The Body of Christ Metaphorically

7/24/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
7/24/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 15: Christ's Mystical Body." (pp. 401-421). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly briefly engages the question of the church in the East failing to mature in its theological statements after the Nicene council of 325 (Kelly 1978, p. 401). Kelly's analysis does find that in the East there is little or no discussion of hierarchy or of the relationship of the churchly society and individual Christian conviction (Kelly 1978, p. 402). However, Kelly considers the theology in the East to have been more complex and developed than the articulations of it would indicate. Expressions of ecclesiology were not of primary importance in the East (Kelly 1978, p. 403). The unity of Christians was of great importance, and was understood to be rooted in Christ. Kelly identifies the importance of this mystical union of Christians in Jesus in some depth.
   During the fourth and fifth centuries, the rise of "the great patriarchates" became more self-conscious (Kelly 1978, p. 406). The major cities rose to prominence as places of influence. As time went by, Kelly finds a greater comfort with an acceptance of the bishop of Rome serving as the primary bishop (Kelly 1978, p. 408).
   Kelly finds that in Western theology it was considered necessary to find points of unity which would gather Christians together (Kelly 1978, p. 409). The unity, as we saw in the East, is an incorporation with Christ's body (Kelly 1978, p. 410). The Donatist controversy, then, rose to a critical level of importance. Among the Donatists, there was suspicion or rejection of those who may have been considered unworthy. A reaction against the Donatists observed that even those who have wavered in their faith may have administered the Sacraments rightly, so their acts would be received (Kelly 1978, p. 411).
   Augustine developed the Western explanations of the Donatist situation in greater depth than Western thinkers before him (Kelly 1978, p. 412). he argued that the schismatics still had the sacraments, though they did not personally benefit from them. As Christ is the head of the body, the whole body of Christ is one unit (Kelly 1978, p. 413). The essence of the Donatist schism, in Augustine's opinion, was their departure from the love of God in Christ. They kept the forms of the sacraments and engaged in holy living but without Christian charity (Kelly 1978, p. 415). Augustine further postulated a distinction between an "essential Church, composed of those who genuinely belong to Christ, and the outward or empirical Church" (Kelly 1978, p. 415). To him, again, the sign of genuine Christian faith could be seen in charity.
   By the mid fifth century, the Roman church had effectively established its primacy in the West and asserted its primacy in the East (Kelly 1978, p. 417). Kelly sees this move activated by the history of Rome and the representative role of popes in doctrinal and political matters. The nature of authority which may have been inherited from Peter was less clear, but gradually came to be seen as normative (Kelly 1978, pp. 418-419). Doctrinal statements tended to follow after an acceptance of the de facto papal primacy (Kelly 1978, p. 420).

Concepts of Salvation in Early Christianity

7/17/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
7/17/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 14: Christ's Saving Work." (pp. 375-400). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly sees discussion of the nature of redemption to have been a battle-ground in the Church beginning in the 12th century. For this reason, the doctrines of soteriology were not clearly articulated in early Christianity (Kelly 1978, p. 375). However, three rather significant points of view do emerge. First, by the time of Irenaeus, we find a "physical" or "mystical" theory, in which the Incarnation by its very act transformed human nature (Kelly 1978, p. 375). Another theory suggested redemption as a ransom paid to the Devil. A third view, often called "realist," retained a focus on Christ's sufferings. Here the salient factor is Jesus' work to suffer for sins (Kelly 1978, p. 376). The three views can often be seen to complement one another As in other chapters, Kelly walks through a number of Fathers and regional schools to identify the presence of different teachings.
   Athanasius typically looks to the view that, by becoming man, Christ "restored the divine image in us, but blended with this is the conviction that His death was necessary to release us from the curse of sin, and that He offered Himself in sacrifice for us" (Kelly 1978, p. 377). Only Jesus can restore us to the image of God This work is often phrased in terms of deification (Kelly 1978, p. 378). Christ's death is sufficient to pay the penalty for all men's sin. It is this which releases us from the bondage of sin (Kelly 1978, p. 380).
   The fourth century Greek fathers, particularly Gregory of Nyssa, articulated a physical theory of redemption (Kelly 1978, p. 380). In the Greek Fathers, it is clear that the incarnation is the root of redemption. Jesus takes us into himself, becoming the ground of our salvation (Kelly 1978, p. 381). Jesus' resurrection is the event which particularly serves as our resurrection as well. Gregory of Nyssa also considered fallen humanity to have been the possession, in some way, of the Devil. Jesus' death therefore broke the bonds of death in which the Devil held us (Kelly 1978, p. 382). His sacrifice therefore both satisfies God's justice and rescues us from death. This same view was held by Basil of Caesarea (Kelly 1978, p. 383). These points of view could be understood as saying that God needed to pay a ransom to the Devil. John Chrysostom built a case which was less open to this charge. In his teaching, the Devil's ability to hold mankind captive was the natural result of human sin. It was the work of the sinless Jesus which made the Devil's claims to dominion over humanity null and void (Kelly 1978, p. 384). Thus no ransom was paid to the Devil. Rather, his power was broken by the application of a redeemed condition to men. The sacrifice of Christ is offered to the Father on behalf of sinful humans. This substitutionary sacrifice is clear in Eusebius of Caesarea and Cyril of Jerusalem (Kelly 1978, p. 384). This view appears in numerous other Greek Fathers.
   Kelly finds that Western views of the fourth century are largely in accord with the Eastern views (Kelly 1978, p. 386). In many instances, this could be seen as a form of Platonic realism, as Jesus is the human form who recreates humanity in his own image. By his incarnation Jesus re-makes sinful humans (Kelly 1978, p. 387). He also broke the bondage to sin which involved the Devil as the one who kept sinful man imprisoned. Though Kelly finds a focus on the power of the Devil being broken by Jesus, there is also an acknowledgement tha Jesus' death served as the perfect sacrifice before God, thus releasing us from God's condemnation (Kelly 1978, p. 388). Ambrose particularly points out that the judgment against sin remained, but the one to be punished was changed from sinful man to the sinless Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 389).
   Augustine drew the various threads of doctrine together, setting the tone for medieval thought in the West (Kelly 1978, p. 390). He grounded his teaching on Christ as the mediator between God and man. In his view, that biblical concept was the starting point for our understanding of salvation in Christ. Jesus' role as mediator starts with the incarnation, by which he participates in our humanity and allows us to participate in his immortality (Kelly 1978, p. 391). The Devil who held sinful man in bondage, never really had rights over man. Jesus' death broke the bondage, which had been claimed illegitimately by the Devil (Kelly 1978, p. 392). The defeat of the Devil takes place because God's justice has been satisfied, therefore the Devil is unable to make any claim at all on redeemed humans.
   Kelly does not find any early fifth century figures in the East who compare with Augustine in the West (Kelly 1978, p. 395). The realist theories tend to come to prominence, in the writings, for example, of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The incarnation redeems man from sin, with the redemption being applied in the death of Christ as a ransom, both from and to God. The concept of satisfying the Devil's claim on sinful humanity fell into the background (Kelly 1978, p. 396). He was rather seen as a conquered usurper. The death of Christ, and particularly his resurrection, served to break the power of death (Kelly 1978, p. 398).

Augustine and Pelagius: Grace and Free Will

7/10/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
7/10/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 13: Fallen Man and God's Grace." (pp. 344-374). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly views the Christian understanding of the fallen nature of man to have been fairly positive at the start of the Christian period. Especially in contrast to Manichaean fatalism and Gnostic views that matter is evil, Christianity held an optimistic point of view (Kelly 1978, p. 344). In reaction to Pelagius, however, the scale tipped toward a more negative view, especially in the writings of Augustine.
   Kelly describes the two important theories about the origin of the soul in the period leading up to Augustine. Most took the soul to be created individually when infused into the body. This "creationist" view was consistent with much Greek philosophy and was broadly accepted. Kelly mentions Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, and Pelagius as adherents to creationism (Kelly 1978, p. 345). Augustine, however, found himself leaning toward "traducian" explanations, in which the soul comes into existence, generated from the parents, and is not separable from the body. This view is hinted at in Gregory of Nyssa, though it is more clear in Tertullian. Kelly does observe of Augustine, however, "despite his bias to traducianism, he could never make up his mind about the matter, and in his later writings frankly confessed that he was baffled" (Kelly 1978, p. 346).
   To introduce the Greek view of the human condition, Kelly reviews Athanasius' testimony, which "is a blend of Platonizing metaphysics and the Genesis story" (Kelly 1978, p. 346). As a creature, man has an ephemeral physicality. However, he is also given the generous favor of God. This makes him blessed and enables communion with God. The failure of Adam and Eve to keep their attention focused on God brought death and destruction (Kelly 1978, p. 347). Athanasius seems to have thought that humans could turn to God through their own volition, but that it would not seem natural to them.
   Athanasius' view strongly influenced the Greek fathers (Kelly 1978, p. 348). The Cappadocians viewed creation strongly in terms of the Platonic Forms, with the Edenic world as the world of Forms. Even after the fall, in which the humans had misused their free will, the nature is only badly defaced, and we are not guilty of sin transmitted to us by Adam's fall (Kelly 1978, p. 349). However, in some way, they still hold that sin is characteristic. it is the rule, rather than the exception (Kelly 1978, p. 351). To reverse the pattern of sin was generally seen as a cooperative work between the divine and human will.
   Kelly notes that we have little information from the West about the human nature prior to Augustine. The witness we do have is mainly from Ambrose and from Ambrosiaster (Kelly 1978, p. 353). They, in turn, may have drawn considerable inspiration from the Cappadocians. The sin of Adam received more attention in the West than in the East, as did the potential for a sinful nature to be transmitted to subsequent generations. hereditary sins are forgiven in baptism, while individual sins are forgiven in the washing of feet, according to Ambrose (Kelly 1978, p. 355, citing De myst. 32; enarr. in ps. 48.8). In Ambrosiaster, humans become guilty because they sin, rather than being born guilty (Kelly 1978, p. 356).
   In Kelly's analysis, the existence side by side of a concept of the fallen nature and of human responsibility could be expected to lead to conflict due to the subtle nuance needed to reconcile their relationship (Kelly 1978, p. 347). The clash came about as Augustine, in 396, referred to mankind as a "lump of sin." At that time, Pelagius, teaching in Rome, taught a positive view of human nature. Against Augustine's emphasis on the need for God to give what we need so we can receive him, Pelagius emphasized unconditional free will and human responsibility. Pelagius' view was that God had given humans the ability to realize their state and to act with their free will to turn toward or away from God (Kelly 1978, p. 358). They did not have a predisposition in either direction. Grace is an offer God makes to all, especially through the external means of His Word (Kelly 1978, p. 360). The Christian life then becomes largely an effort of the will, which strives to follow God in Christ.
   Augustine had worked out his view of human nature before the rise of Pelagius' teaching (Kelly 1978, p. 361). From a created state of human perfection, Adam fell due to his own fault (Kelly 1978, p. 362). Augustine's understanding of the nature of sin and Adam's guilt depended on many passages of Scripture. He further understood the practice of infant baptism to acknowledge the sin inherent even in newborns (Kelly 1978, p. 363). Every human, in Augustine's view, was involved in Adam's sin, since all came from Adam (Kelly 1978, p. 364). Our inclination is always toward sin, although we have a terribly hindered spark of virtue in us due to our original creation in the image of God. We have further lost the liberty of doing good and avoiding evil which Adam had (Kelly 1978, p. 365). Kelly does note that Augustine still thought man had a free will, but that it was predisposed to choose evil.
   Augustine's view of human nature and sin, therefore, indicated that without an infusion of God's grace we would never attempt to do what is good (Kelly 1978, p. 366). Augustine saw several facets of God's grace. By "prevenient' grace God stirs our will up. By "cooperating" grace he moves our will which has been stirred up. There is "sufficient" grace which allows us to seek the good. Then there is "efficient" grace which enables us to do the good God expects (Kelly 1978, p. 367). Kelly observes that within Augustine's point of view, not all people receive the gift of sufficient or efficient grace, as not all are recipients of salvation (Kelly 1978, p. 369). The mystery of God having mercy on whom he wills and hardening whom he wills remains a genuine mystery.
   Pelagianism was officially rejected in the council of Carthage in 418 (Kelly 1978, p. 369). Essential to the rejection were the Pelagian stances that death was inherent in human nature, that sin was not inherited from Adam, and that an infusion of grace was not necessary to draw humans to salvation (Kelly 1978, p. 370). Those three elements of Pelagian thought separated it from orthodoxy. Kelly notes there were further discussions involving views which, since the 17th century, have been called semi-Pelagian. They would still insist that free will to choose to believe is inherent in all humans (Kelly 1978, p. 370). These views have continued to be opposed as they disputed the extent of the fall into sin and minimized the need for God's work in salvation (Kelly 1978, pp. 371-372).
   As Kelly describes it, the concept of the human nature and sin in the East developed rather along the lines of Augustine's view. Cyril of Alexandria saw Adam's sin as corrupting the human nature. While we are not responsible with Adam, we are ruined with Adam (Kelly 1978, p. 372). While Cyril saw a human free will, he did not believe it could recapture the perfection of Adam. The Antiochene school, illustrated by Theodore and Theodoret, is compatible with the Alexandrian view.

Mother of God or Mother of Christ?

7/3/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
7/3/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 12: The Christological Settlement." (pp. 310-343). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly considers the period of 428-451 as a critical time of Christological evaluation, as the start is marked by the beginning of Nestorianism and the end by the council of Chalcedon (Kelly 1978, p. 310). He has previously described the basic positions as "Word-flesh," in which the Word is of primary interest and the human soul in Christ is downplayed, and the "Word-man" position, in which the real and complete human nature in Christ may become of prime importance. The clash of theology, politics, and personalities was a pronounced factor in the discussion. The terms used in the debates were applied to Mary. Whether she was θεοτόκος (God-bearer) or χριστοτόκος (Christ-bearer) took on importance (Kelly 1978, p. 311). Nestorius, followed by Theodore of Mopsuestia, maintaining that God cannot have a mother, argued for χριστοτόκος. The other view, in his opinion, is Arian as it asserts the Son as a creature. Cyril of Alexandria, on the other hand, maintained that Nestorius' position advocated adoptionism and divided the Christ into two persons (Kelly 1978, pp. 311-312). Later, Nestorius, in his Book of Heracleides, which was only re-discovered in the 20th century, endorses the view of Chalcedon, demonstrating that Nestorius was not a Nestorian (Kelly 1978, p. 312).
   Kelly finds that Nestorius considered the divine and human natures in Jesus each to be complete, unaltered, and distinct. At the same time, neither could be diminished and they could not be separated (Kelly 1978, p. 312). He was clear that Chrsit is one and only one person, but bearing two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 314). Kelly observes that Nestorius took a divergent view of the communication of attributes. Rather than maintaining that in Christ the divine took on some of the attributes of the human, Nestorius saw it as a moot point, as both the human and the divine were fully operational in the one person of Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 316).
   Cyril of Alexandria vigorously opposed Nestorius, taking him to create "a merely external association between the Word and an ordinary man" (Kelly 1978, p. 318, Kelly's words). This could lead to the idea that an ordinary man died on the cross and that there is no divine presence in the Eucharist. In Kelly's opinion, Cyril's understanding of Nestorius was strongly influenced by the fact that Cyril adhered to the "Word-flesh" view, rather than the "Word-man" view. Cyril's response to the Nestorian controversy was to forcefully emphasize the unity of Christ almost to the exclusion of the existence of two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 321). Kelly observes that with the passage of time, Cyril came to see a greater role of the fully human nature in his Christology than he had before, though he always guarded against any hint of separating the two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 323).
   Cyril and Nestorius both appealed to Pope Celestine, with a considerable volume of writing on the part of Cyril. On August 11, 430, Celestine condemned the teaching of Nestorius in writing, giving him ten days after receiving notification to repudiate his points of view (Kelly 1978, p. 324). Cyril was responsible for evaluating any change. He, accordingly, sent Nestorius a set of twelve anathemas for his agreement. This action, along with the wording of the anathemas, which were predictably offensive to Antiochene theologians, was problematic to Pope Celestine (Kelly 1978, p. 325). The conflict between the Antiochian and Alexandrian factions persisted. In June of 431, in Ephesus, Cyril held a council in which Nestorius was deposed and anathematized (Kelly 1978, p. 327). The Antiochian delegation, which had been delayed, four days later deposed Cyril and rejected his anathemas. When the papal delegation arrived two weeks later, they took the side of Cyril. Kelly goes on to describe the correspondence among the parties to the debate in some detail. Much of the dissent had died down by 433 (Kelly 1978, p. 330). However, in 448, a Christological controversy arose again.
   "Matters were brought to a head by the cause of Eutyches, the aged and muddle-headed archimandrite who, because of the favour and influence he enjoyed at court, found himself the rallying-point of all who disliked the accord of 433" (Kelly 1978, p. 331). In November of 448, he was condemned as teaching a form of monophysitism in which the humanity of Christ was absorbed by his divinity. Kelly describes Eutyches' views in some detail, citing a number of self-contradictory statements. Eutyches was reinstated in August of 449, though some of the erroneous formulations involved in the dispute were condemned (Kelly 1978, p. 334).
   In Western Christianity, Kelly sees little Christological development (Kelly 1978, p. 334). The theologians associated with Rome tended to describe the divine and human natures in Christ, but were hesitant to suggest any new formulation (Kelly 1978, pp. 335-336). Consistent with this pattern, Leo's Tome, written in response to the controversy over Eutyches, serves as a commentary on ideas already widely articulated (Kelly 1978, p. 337). This work did go a long way toward bridging the rift between Antioch and Alexandria (Kelly 1978, p. 338).
   Kelly notes that, while the synod which rehabilitated Eutyches was an imperial synod, Leo's work with the Time was under papal control (Kelly 1978, p. 338). The conflict between emperor and pope was defused by the accidental death of the emperor in July of 450. The new emperor, Marcian, called a council in Chalcedon in 451 to resolve differences in faith (Kelly 1978, p. 339). The council, rather than creating a new Christological confession, drew from a number of previous works, creating a mosaic of orthodox explanations of Jesus (Kelly 1978, p. 341). The existence of a fully divine nature and a fully human nature in the one person of Christ was well established in the West (Kelly 1978, p. 342). The East, however, retained some monophysitic tendencies.

Two Natures and One Person

6/26/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
6/26/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 11: Fourth Century Christology." (pp. 280-309). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   In Kelly's view, the Nicene council did not deal comprehensively with the nature of Christ as incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 280). The problem discussed was, rather, the divine nature of the Father and the Son. In this chapter Kelly discusses fourth century Christology as it developed in the East, a more fertile bed for theological pursuits than the West. At issue was primarily whether Christ had a human soul or whether he was the divine Logos but possessing human flesh (Kelly 1978, p. 281).
   In Arian thought, Christ was divine but possessed human flesh. However, his humanity was defective, as he did not have a fully human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 282). In contrast to this view were teachers from Antioch, particularly Eustathius, who sharply questioned the Arian commitment to Christ not having a human nature (Kelly 1978, p. 283). Athanasius, when involved in this discussion, pointed out that in the incarnation, Jesus still was transcendent and had sovereign power over all creation. Yet he was entirely human, having been born of a virgin and having taken on humanity, not merely physicality (Kelly 1978, p. 285). There is thus no dividing of God the Son into the one who is divine and the one who is human. It is the same God the Son who does miracles and who becomes hungry (Kelly 1978, p. 286). Yet Athanasius failed to confirm or deny the existence of a human soul in Jesus. He endorsed Jesus' mind, soul, and intelligence, but was not ready to separate these from the divine nature (Kelly 1978, p. 288).
   The work of Apollinarius of Laodicea pushed the Alexandrian logic about the person of Christ to its limit (Kelly 1978, p. 289). He accordingly rejected the idea of a human mind in Jesus. This was a natural outcome of the thought that the eternal Word of God merely took on flesh, rather than taking on humanity (Kelly 1978, p. 290). Kelly cites Gregory of Nazianzus as rejecting Apollinarianism as a heresy which separates God the Son into two different beings, one the Son of God and the other the son of Mary (Kelly 1978, p. 290). This would effectively mean that Jesus, merely as a man, would be unable to save humans from sin (Kelly 1978, p. 291). Apollinarius saw Jesus as gaining life as the Word of God, thus the divine element making him able to live as if he were human. Jesus' real humanity was thus denied (Kelly 1978, p. 292).
   Kelly observes that, though Apollinarius had engaged in brilliant logical analysis, he faced a swift and forceful response from more orthodox voices. In particular, he had failed to recognize "that to achieve man's salvation, the Only-begotten must have assumed a complete manhood" (Kelly 1978, p. 295). Accordingly, Apollinarius was condemned by a council at Rome in 377, by a synod in Alexandria in 378, and in Antioch in 379, then by the council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1978, p. 296). His view which forced a logical division of the divine and human natures in Christ and eventually denied the human nature rejected the picture given of Jesus in Scripture. Orthodoxy requires that God the Son be fully divine and fully human. While Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa differed in some of the outworking, they nonetheless took Jesus to be fully divine and fully human at the same time (Kelly 1978, p. 298).
   Despite the rejection of Apollinarius, Kelly notes the Alexandrian school retained a conceptual framework based on the Word taking on flesh, yet possibly not having an entirely normal human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 302). It was in the Antiochene school, toward the end of the fourth century and the start of the fifth century, that this was articulated. These thinkers insisted that the incarnate God had an entirely normal human spirit and mind. Kelly discusses this view as articulated by Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia (Kelly 1978, pp. 302ff). Both were accused of Nestorianism due to the difficulty of maintaining that the deity and humanity of Christ were unmixed though not separable (Kelly 1978, p. 303). Moreso than Diodore, Theodore argued that the human nature of Christ was necessary in order for him to suffer from the weaknesses common to humanity. If he did not have a normal human nature, he would never suffer from hunger, thirst, or fatigue (Kelly 1978, p. 304). It was within this human nature that he was able t purchase salvation. The paradigm described, then, is not God the Son as the Word and flesh, but as the Word and man (Kelly 1978, p. 304). The two natures are fully present and cannot be separated, though, in theory, it is possible to draw some descriptive distinctions.
   Theodore of Mopsuestia was roundly accused of holding the concepts of the later Nestorian heresy due to his willingness to accept, in theory, that the deity and humanity of Christ could be distinguished (Kelly 1978, p. 307). However, Kelly observes that much scholarly examination of his writings has shown that he was no kind of Nestorian. He was unwilling to accept any attempt to separate the two natures in Christ. God the Son, in the incarnation, remains one person, though with two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 308).

Articulating the Doctrine of the Trinity

6/19/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
6/19/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 10: The Doctrine of the Trinity." (pp. 252-279). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   As the fourth century progressed, the Nicene formulation regarding the full deity of the Son led to further evaluation of the nature of the Trinity (Kelly 1978, p. 252). The growing acceptance of the Nicene point of view that the Father and the Son were of the same substance led to a recognition of the Holy Spirit as equally divine. Kelly notes a further element in the discussion of doctrine in the reign of Julian the Apostate (361), who allowed extensive interaction among different factions, possibly hoping that the conflict would put an end to Christianity. In the long run, the debate was not so much about the terms used, but about the concepts underlying the terms (Kelly 1978, p. 254).
   With this matter more or less resolved, the nature of the Holy Spirit became a more central element for consideration (Kelly 1978, p. 256). He was easily recognized as a member of the Trinity. Yet the problem of discussing substance in the case of a spirit was significant. Athanasius, responding to some Egyptian Christians who understood the Holy Spirit as inferior and part of creation, described the Holy Spirit as "fully divine, consubstantial with the Father and the Son" (Kelly 1978, p. 257, Kelly's summary). The Holy Spirit is a person of the Godhead and not a part of the created order.
   The Cappadocian Fathers, though exercising caution, developed Athanasius' view of the Holy Spirit, describing his being given "from the Father through the Son" (Kelly 1978, p. 259). Their view was not universally embraced, as there remained those who would deny consubstantiality of the persons of the Godhead regardless. yet the Cappadocian Fathers' point of view did gradually become more broadly accepted (Kelly 1978, p. 260). Kelly observes that the remaining Arians complained of the Cappadocians that they held to the Father having two sons. This required articulating the different origin of the Son and the Spirit. The statement which proved definitive was that of Gregory of Nyssa, who taught that the Spirit "is out of God and is of Christ' He proceeds out of the Father and receives from the Son; He cannot be separated from the Word" (Kelly 1978, p. 262).
   Kelly observes that this discussion of the Holy Spirit formed the backdrop for the council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1978, p. 263). There the Holy Spirit was formally described in an ecumenically endorsed statement as consubstantial with the Father and the Son. The three persons of the Godhead are seen as undivided, though existing in three persons (Kelly 1978, p. 264). The terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" may essentially be understood to describe relation, while "God" describes essence (Kelly 1978, p. 266). The issue of divisibility persisted, as there is debate (as early as Aristotle) as to whether anything non-material is divisible. The solution reached by the Cappadocians was that though each Person of the Godhead is one, they cannot be added together, as there is only one unique nature involved (Kelly 1978, p. 268).
   The consideration of the nature of the Trinity in the East was paralleled in the West. By the time of Ambrose, theologians were articulating one God in three persons (Kelly 1978, p. 269). Kelly notes in particular the work of Victorinus. He considered that the living nature of God is, in effect, always moving, and thus capable of eternal generation without change, as the unchanging nature of a moving God is to do things (Kelly 1978, p. 270). The different persons of the Trinity are all equally God but typically perform different roles.
   Augustine was, in Kelly's opinion, the one who provided the definitive articulations of the Trinity in the West (Kelly 1978, p. 271). Kelly references Augustine's work De Trinitate, assembled at various times from 399 and 419. Augustine takes the fact of one God in three persons as a Scriptural given, then creates exposition based on that idea (Kelly 1978, p. 272). God is one, and each member of the Trinity is fully divine and of the same nature. Kelly sees Augustine's view as well described in the Athanasian Creed, which he dates later than Augustine (Kelly 1978, p. 273). Augustine was not satisfied with the term "persons," yet he accepted it as a matter of common use (Kelly 1978, p. 274). Yet, as opposed to the Arians, he rejected the idea that a "person" might imply a distinction of substance. As to the procession of the Spirit, Augustine took Him to be the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. he would therefore teach that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (Kelly 1978, p. 275). Yet he definitively rejected the idea that the Father begot the Son and the Spirit, using the language of procession instead (Kelly 1978, p. 276).

What Was Arius Trying to Do?

6/12/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
6/12/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 9: The Nicene Crisis." (pp. 223-251). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
Kelly takes the start of the fourth century to open a new phase of the development of Christian doctrine. In this period the question of the nature of the Godhead came to the fore, serving to spur attempts to articulate the doctrine of the Trinity (Kelly 1978, p. 223). At the opening of the fourth century, we have little information about a Western view of the place of the Word in the godhead. In the East, the emphasis had primarily been on divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 224). The distinctions were held as mysterious and didn't receive much discussion.
   In the first third of the fourth century, Alexander of Alexandria, while affirming the unity of the Godhead, still asserted that the Word, while uncreated, served as a mediator between God and creation (Kelly 1978, p. 224). While the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and cannot be separated from the Father, he is, in some way, not completely identical to the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 225). In contrast to Alexander, Eusebius considers the Word to be God, yet he is hesitant to appeal to co-eternity (Kelly 1978, p. 226). Eusebius will affirm that the Father and Son share an identical glory.
   Arius, a presbyter from Alexandria, entered into this discussion in the decade before 324 (Kelly 1978, p. 226). He was clear that the Father was ingenerate, eternal, and without beginning. Because God is never changing, Arius considered it impossible that he could share in substance with any other being, as that would diminish him (Kelly 1978, p. 227). For this reason, Arius believed it necessary that the Son must be created. This resulted in a doctrine of the Son as not self-existent, not eternal, and differing from the Father in his essence (Kelly 1978, p. 228). In short, the Son is finite, while the Father is infinite. This subjects the Son to accusations of change and even sin (Kelly 1978, p. 229).
   Arius' teaching gained some traction for several years, though Kelly observes that it would not have been broadly acceptable in the East or West. Receiving notice from Constantine in 324, the move toward unity of doctrine resulted in the council of Nicea in 325 (Kelly 1978, p. 231). The creedal statement, which is essentially that which we use today, was to receive elaboration of the third article at a later date. It also included a statement anathematizing several specific statements of Arian thought (Kelly 1978, p. 232). Subsequently, Athanasius wrote a number of treatises to refute Arius' claims. Kelly notes that in many ways the Nicene Creed engages in negative teaching. The positive theological teachings intended are more difficult to articulate (Kelly 1978, p. 233). The statements about the substance of the Son, however, are clear. At issue, in Kelly's opinion, is the extent to which the Creed rejected Origen's understanding of the nature of οὐσία in the Son (Kelly 1978, p. 234). It was understood by later theologians that the Father and the Son have an identical nature. It is not entirely clear what Origen had intended in using that language.
   In the twenty years or so after the council of Nicea, Arianism continued to be a matter of serious debate (Kelly 1978, p. 237). Ariaans who had been exiled continued to teach, and to return into the empire. Some were able to depose and even exile supporters of the Nicene faith (Kelly 1978, p. 238). Eventually, however, the council of Constantinople in 381 reaffirmed the Nicean faith. Kelly describes the polemics in use during the period in some detail (Kelly 1978, p. 239).
   The Nicene party included radical and more moderate elements. Kelly describes the more radical element as leaning toward a Sabellian point of view in which the Logos cannot be distinguished from the Father in any meaningful way (Kelly 1978, p. 240). Athanasius strikes Kelly as a more moderate adherent to the nicene faith. His affirmation that the Son must be fully divine was not remotely Sabellian in nature. Rather, salvation is possible only if the Son is just as divine as the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 243). On this account, Athanasius would condemn Arian thought. Because the Father is eternal and uncreated, not limited by time, so the Son is eternal and uncreated (Kelly 1978, p. 244). The Son is distinct from the Father, but is of the same nature.
   In opposition to the Nicene party, Kelly identifies three parties (Kelly 1978, p. 247). One was conciliatory in tone but consistently left ways an Arian could remain in fellowship with orthodoxy. For example, the united will of the Godhead, or the fact that the Son was begotten outside of time would be emphasized (Kelly 1978, p. 248). Another party was specifically and unabashedly Arian, often manifest in "a neo-Platonic metaphysic of three hierarchically ordered, mutually exclusive οὐσίαι" (Kelly 1978, p. 249). Finally, there was a group sometimes (unfairly) described as Semi-Arian (Kelly 1978, p. 249). They preferred to take no definitive stand on the nature of the generation of the Son. These parties in opposition to Nicene piety generally dissipated toward the end of the fourth century (Kelly 1978, p. 251).

Community, Baptism, and Eucharist in the 3rd Century

6/5/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
6/5/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 8: The Christian Community." (pp. 189-220). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   While we may be tempted to think of early Christianity in terms of independent local congregations, Kelly notes that Ignatius considered the churches as part of one larger body. The Smyrnans reported on Polycarp's martyrdom to multiple churches (Kelly 1978, p. 188). The concept of one larger, universal church is present from the earliest time. This concept can also be found in the second century apologists, who treated the Church as representing a universal body of beliefs (Kelly 1978, p. 189). Kelly notes, however, that counter to many 20th century assumptions, the early Christians did not think in terms of a "visible" and "invisible" church. In their view, the Church was always something with a visible manifestation (Kelly 1978, p. 191). The concept of an invisible church was a fruit of Gnostic thought. It was therefore opposed by the orthodox thinkers (Kelly 1978, p. 192).
   Sacraments, in this period, were understood as "external rites, more precisely signs, which Christians believe convey, by Christ's appointment, an unseen sanctifying grace" (Kelly 1978, p. 193). Kelly considers baptism, eucharist, and penance, as he finds evidence for these practices as early as the second century. The technical terms μυστήριον or sacramentum were not in clear use before the time of the Alexandrian fathers and Tertullian.
   Baptism, from this time period, was seen as the entry into the church (Kelly 1978, p. 194). It was seen as effective in cleansing from sin and imparting the holy Spirit, and thus, life. A literal anointing with oil may or may not have been practiced. However, Kelly maintains that the symbolic view of an anointing of the Holy Spirit was recognized and was distinguished from the various Gnostic anointings (Kelly 1978, p. 195).
   The eucharist, which was not received by those who were not baptized, was fairly quickly recognized as some form of a sacrifice (Kelly 1978, p. 196). The actual nature of this sacrifice was less clearly defined. Kelly finds it related to prayer as well as serving as a "memorial." In general, he sees the understood motion as an offering made to God, though it is also clear that it is related to jesus' offering himself for humans (Kelly 1978, p. 197).
   Kelly notes that, though there is evidence for a sacrament of penance, it is "bafflingly meagre" (Kelly 1978, p. 198). The purpose is to deal with sins in the life after baptism. In the second century, Kelly finds it common to maintain that sins committed purposely could not be remitted. Yet, in practice, it would seem most took a more lenient approach (Kelly 1978, p. 199).
   From a doctrinal standpoint, Kelly does not see many developments during the second century (Kelly 1978, p. 200). The Church was one body throughout the world, and was that which unified all the individual congregations. Toward the end of the second century, some forms of rigorist thought, which we might consider akin to Pietism, arose. The particular acts of righteousness which were expected of Christians became more clearly codified, along with penitential practices (Kelly 1978, p. 201). The Church, in some cases, was viewed more as a training ground for sinners than as a gathering of the righteous. Kelly describes at some length, however, the views of Clement and others in Alexandria who emphasized the church as the gathering of the righteous, often in terms of a pure heart rooted in γνῶσις (Kelly 1978, p. 202-203). In contrast to the eastern view of Alexandria, Cyprian of Carthage emphasized a "practical and even legalistic" orientation (Kelly 1978, p. 204). This view was to dominate the West until the time of Augustine. Unity is to be found in the agreement of the various bishops as they seek out a unified understanding of the Christian faith (Kelly 1978, p. 205). Schismatics could not be tolerated in the Church. Therefore, belief and practice needed to be clearly defined (Kelly 1978, p. 206).
   In the course of the third century, Kelly notes that schismatic controversies and the rapid growth of the church had an influence on baptismal practices and understandings (Kelly 1978, p. 207). Baptism came to be understood more in terms of forgiveness of sins but less in terms of an impartation of the Holy Spirit. This shift moved the expected reception of the Holy Spirit to coincide with a laying on of hands or chrismation (Kelly 1978, p. 208). In this process, the effect of water baptism was downplayed. In some authors, the laying on of hands by the bishop, thus imparting the Holy Spirit, was understood as the critical need (Kelly 1978, p. 210).
   Eucharistic doctrine did not undergo much development in the third century, though Kelly does find the emphasis to shift slightly more toward that of a eucharistic sacrifice. The concept of the presence of the body and blood of Christ feeding the soul remained fairly consistent (Kelly 1978, p. 211). Kelly does particularly observe a difference in language used regarding the Eucharist. Tertullian, among others, affirms that the bread "represents" the body of Christ. However, in the idiom of the time, the word meant that the bread made Jesus' body present again (Kelly 1978, p. 212). It was not understood as we would now consider a symbol. Kelly illustrates this in some detail. He finds that Cyprian of Carthage articulated the concept of a eucharistic sacrifice, by describing the Eucharist in terms of doing exactly what Jesus did, including, in some way, making a pleasing offering of the passion of Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 215).
   By the start of the third century Kelly finds at least an outline of a penitential discipline recognized (Kelly 1978, p. 216). It appeared to be a public observation, rather than the private confession and absolution with which we are more familiar. Public penance was very serious and could only be undertaken once in a lifetime, after baptism. It was reserved for sins we would consider very serious, such as idolatry, adultery, or homicide (Kelly 1978, p. 217). Less notorious sins were to be cared for by individual repentance, and were not particularly mediated by the Church. During the third century a tendency for the more notorious sins to be dealt with by the bishops without public ceremony grew up (Kelly 1978, p. 218).

Implications of Redemption in Christ

5/29/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/29/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 7: Man and His Redemption." (pp. 163-188). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   In this chapter, Kelly turns his attention to the attempts at explaining why humanity is in need of salvation and the way that salvation is granted through Jesus. He notes that through the late first century and the second century the condition is taken for granted and the fact of salvation in Christ is asserted, but not sufficiently explained (Kelly 1978, p. 163). The closest statements he finds to an explanation have to do with humans receiving a knowledge of Christ. This is a broadly held concept, but it falls short in terms of serving as an explanation (Kelly 1978, p. 164). Kelly additionally finds some statements which affirm Jesus' work as our substitute. However, the function is not altogether clear (Kelly 1978, p. 165). It is normally viewed as a way that we are challenged to repentance, though in Barnabas Jesus has the role of a sacrifice. Ignatius does go so far as to say that by his death Jesus abolishes sin and death (Kelly 1978, p. 166).
   Kelly sees a significant shift in the work of the Apologists (Kelly 1978, p. 166). They see humanity as a combination of body and soul, and portray the soul as having rational powers to decide whether or not to live as Christ would desire. In Justin's thought, our free desire to please God is interfered with by demonic forces which would confuse us and entice us into sin (Kelly 1978, p. 167). Our temptation to sin, then, is like that to which Eve fell prey.
   Tatian and Theophilus treat the fall into sin in a similar way to Justin, but with more nuance, holding still that the fall into sin was provoked by demonic forces, and that remaining sin in the world can be overcome through out will. All evil, therefore, is a consequence of sin (Kelly 1978, p. 168).
   Kelly finds that only Justin gives a concrete reason for the incarnation and that it is didactic in nature (Kelly 1978, p. 168). Christ becomes man to show us how we should live. Jesus' work, then, is that of illumination. He gives us the knowledge we need (Kelly 1978, p. 169). In this work, Jesus breaks the demonic power which has hindered us.
   In Kelly's view, the most substantial development of the period was to articulate the implications of Paul's teaching that in Christ there is "a new, restored humanity" (Kelly 1978, p. 170). This concept led to developments in both anthropology and Christology. Kelly considers Irenaeus and Justin to be at the forefront of these attempts to explain both concepts. Irenaeus took Adam;s sin to separate him and all humanity from God, changing the already substantial distance between the creator and the created into an enormous chasm (Kelly 1978, p. 172). This condition persisted in all humans. Jesus, then, "became what we are in order to enable us to become what He is" (Haer. 5, praef.) (Kelly 1978, p. 172). In effect, Christ undid what Adam's sin had done. This would allow us to start afresh in Jesus (Kelly 1978, p. 173).
   As is typical, the nature of salvation developed different explanations in the East and the West (Kelly 1978, p. 174). Development in the West was centered in North Africa, anticipating the later work of Augustine. Teertullian emerged as the spokesman at this earlier period. His view considers each soul and body to be a new creation, derived from the parents (Kelly 1978, p. 175). The characteristics of the soul are likewise inherited from parents. We therefore have some remaining attributes of our father Adam, both in bearing the image of God and in having responsibility for sin. We are thus predisposed to sin since we are born of sinful parentage. In Tertullian's view, then, Chrsit's death for us functions primarily as a sacrifice, atoning for our sin and restoring us to Adam's image. Kelly observes that though the seed of a substitutionary atonement is present, it is not fully developed (Kelly 1978, p. 177). Subsequent Western theologians tended to write in terms of an atonement as well as of an example (Kelly 1978, p. 178).
   In the East, in contrast, the inherited nature of sin was "largely absent" (Kelly 1978, p. 179). Humans, with their free will, were to progress toward perfection. Any inheritance of sin is related to our inheritance of desires which are disordered, rather than an inheritance of guilt (Kelly 1978, p. 180). Origen goes so far as to take the Genesis account as a piece of mythology to be interpreted as a sign that all souls are pre-existent. God gave all the souls a free will which could imitate God or not. They all chose, to one or another extent, not to imitate God. This explains sin among humans as well as the existence of demons. Some souls were bound to bodies as a punishment (Kelly 1978, p. 181). While Kelly does not take Origen's system to have been adopted as a whole, the basic premises of a sharp distinction between physicality and spirituality were broadly accepted (Kelly 1978, p. 183).
   The work of Christ was likewise taken in a relatively mystical sense in the East (Kelly 1978, p. 183). In Clement, for example, the real work of Jesus was to teach true knowledge which would purify human desires (Kelly 1978, p. 184). This ultimately leads to some sort of theosis. Humans eventually may become God (Protr. 12, 120, 3). Jesus serves as an example for humans. However, in Origen's thought, he also was engaged in defeating the Devil and taking control over the earth (Kelly 1978, p. 185). This was finally accomplished in his death and resurrection. Origen additionally saw Christ's death as a propitiatory sacrifice (Kelly 1978, p. 186). The offering had the effect of satisfying the justice of the Father. The role of Jesus in salvation is thus very complex. Again, Kelly observes that the views of Origen were not universally accepted in the East. However, the complex nature of the work of Chrsit was broadly admitted (Kelly 1978, p. 187).

Christology in the Second and Third Centuries

5/22/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/22/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 6: The Beginnings of Christology." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition. (pp. 138-162). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Though the full issue of Christology was at the center of the Council of Nicea in 325, Kelly traces partial formulations of specific issues back to the apostolic period (Kelly 1978, p. 138). Jesus had nearly universally been considered both divine and human, a conviction rooted in the New Testament. The difficulty was in showing "how the two aspects could be held together in synthesis" (Kelly 1978, p. 139).
   Kelly observes there were a number of heretical sects which emerged in the second century, denying the deity of Christ. These would include the Ebionites and the monarchian heretics (Kelly 1978, pp. 139-140). Some took the opposite tack, taking Jesus to be entirely divine and not actually human, such as the Docetists (Kelly 1978, p. 141). Much of Gnosticism can be taken similarly to deny the actual humanity of Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 142).
   Counter to these errors, orthodoxy insisted on both the true divine and human natures being present in the one Jesus (Kelly 1978, p. 143). Kelly traces the idea of Jesus' full divinity and humanity to Barnabas, Hermas, and to Ignatius of Antioch, who was quite explicit about it (Kelly 1978, p. 144). Some authors tended to equate the pre-incarnate Christ with the Holy Spirit.
   In Kelly's view, the second century Apologists provide rather little explanation of their view of Christ. He is treated as God and man, though at times the descriptions may come close to allowing accusations of modalism (Kelly 1978, p. 145). Incarnation and physical sufferings are acknowledged. However, the co-existence of the two natures in one person is not explained to any significant degree (Kelly 1978, p. 146).
   The Christology of Irenaeus, in Kelly's estimation, is more strongly influenced by the apostles Paul and John than by the Apologists (Kelly 1978, p. 147). He emphasizes the unity of God and man in Jesus, rejecting the separation common in Gnostic thought. Christ must have a truly human bodily nature (Kelly 1978, p. 148). Otherwise he could not have served as the second Adam.
   In the West, Kelly emphasizes the enormous influence of Hippolytus and Tertullian (Kelly 1978, p. 149). Hippolytus is clear that the Logos became flesh, putting on the entirety of human nature but without sin. This stands in sharp contrast to the Docetists. Yet Jesus remains the divine Logos, never surrendering that nature. Tertullian took a similar view. However, in his discussion, he preferred to say that Christ was made of 'two substances" (Kelly 1978, p. 150). This term could cause difficulty as the persons of the Godhead are now routinely described as one in "substance."
   Tertullian's description, which is the first known attempt to describe the relationship of human and divine (Kelly 1978, p. 151), is that the Word was not transfigured into flesh, but that he "clothed" himself in flesh. God is immutable, so to become flesh he had to take on flesh. Jesus is at once both God and man. The paradoxes implied by this view are recognized by Tertullian, who finally embraces them (Kelly 1978, p. 152).
   The Alexandrian school, represented by Clement, made attempts to defend the full divinity and humanity of Christ. However, terminology of attachment left Clement open to charges of Docetism (Kelly 1978, p. 154). he was, however, clear that Jesus was a real human with a real human body. Clement's soteriology was largely predicated on the identity of Jesus as the divine Logos, rather than on his humanity.
   Origen also saw Jesus as entirely human while still being the divine Logos (Kelly 1978, p. 155). He viewed the unity of the divine and human to be unbreakable. Jesus possessed a whole human nature and full divinity. And Origen was clear that the divinity persists in the human (Kelly 1978, p. 156). Kelly observes that Origen was the first to use terminology of Jesus as God Incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 157). However, he did not consider the humanity of Jesus "either permanent or essential" (Kelly 1978, p. 157). While Origen was not Docetic, he considered Jesus' humanity to have fallen away after the resurrection.
   After Origen, in the East there was hesitancy about the pre-existence of souls as well as a concern about the implications of introducing human mind into the divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 158). The unity of the Godhead was considered to be of necessity a unity of substance. For this reason it was much easier to admit of Jesus having a human body but not a human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 159). Kelly does observe that the discussions of this matter are fragmentary in nature (Kelly 1978, p. 159). The records are all from the fifth century, making it difficult to discern actual third century opinion. However, Kelly considers it clear that Origen was fairly quickly accused of holding adoptionist views (Kelly 1978, p. 160). Origen's view of the Christological problem was largely rejected, as it is unclear that the two natures were fully enduring in the one person (Kelly 1978, p. 161).

Trinitarianism in the Third Century

5/15/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/15/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 5: Third-Century Trinitarianism." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition. (pp. 109-137). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   While the earliest Christians were Trinitarian, Kelly points out that the main issue through the second century had been combatting paganism and gnostic thought, which postulated a multiplicity of gods. In the third century, it became more important to articulate the unity of God but his manifestation in three persons (Kelly 1978, p. 109). Previous attempts at explanation focused on the functions of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit rather than the interpersonal relationship within the Godhead.
   Among the chief third century thinkers Kelly discusses Hippolytus and Tertullian, who stood in the tradition of the second century apologists (Kelly 1978, p. 110). Among modalists, both were considered polytheists. However, they were both strong advocates of the one and only God. The difficulty was to make an adequate description of one God eternally existing in three persons (Kelly 1978, p. 111).
   While Hippolytus tended to use language which could be viewed as subordinationist in nature, Tertullian made arguments which directly attacked modalist views, so strongly defended the identical substance of each person of the Trinity, including the concept of eternity (Kelly 1978, p. 113). Both Hippolytus and Tertullian affirmed that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were one God but in three persons, manifest in different ways at the same time.
   Kelly notes that at the end of the second century the teaching of "Dynamic Monarchianism" was circulating (Kelly 1978, p. 115). In this view, Christ was a mere man but was endued with God's spirit. The teaching may well be considered as adoptionist in nature. Kelly discusses several advocates of this point of view who lived well into the third century.
   The more widespread and lasting form of Monarchianism is properly referred to as Modalism. Here God is one, and Christ is God. For this reason, there must only be one person of the Godhead (Kelly 1978, p. 119). Kelly, with Hippolytus, connects this view with the monism of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (Kelly 1978, pp. 120-121), where the totality consisted of a number of mutually exclusive elements.
   Kelly points out the fact that Hippolytus and Tertullian were not any sort of official spokesmen for the church at Rome, which was emerging as the theological center for the West (Kelly 1978, p. 123). Rather, those in Rome took on the teaching of Hippolytus and Tertullian, using it to defend against the modalist teaching which was spreading in the West. At the start of the third century, popes Zephyrinus and Callistus were sympathetic to modalism. This may well have been at the root of the hostility between Hippolytus and Callistus. Kelly describes Callistus' views in some detail (Kelly 1978, pp. 124-125).
   At the same time, in Alexandria, Clement and Origen emerged as significant thinkers (Kelly 1978, pp. 126-127). Both attempted to discuss the Godhead using structures of Platonism. Clement, who was primarily a moralistic teacher, affirms one God in three persons, largely defined in functional terms, according to the activities of each person (Kelly 1978, p. 127). Origen made a more clearly analytical description of God, using Platonic terms. God the Father is the one God. The Son and Spirit may possibly be seen as "brought into existence" by the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 128). However, this is understood as an eternal act, so Origen rejects a time when the Son did not exist. However, he views the Son and Spirit somehow as secondary. Origen uses terminology of begetting for the Son, but is clear that He is eternally begotten and of the same substance as the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 130). The concept of some sort of hierarchical relationship among members of the Godhead opens Origen to charges of tritheism and subordinationism (Kelly 1978, p. 132).
   Origen's views sparked substantial debate, especially in the Greek world through the remainder of the third century (Kelly 1978, pp. 132-133). Kelly notes a number of attempts to clarify his views, demonstrating either that he was genuinely Trinitarian or that he was a modalist or tritheist (Kelly 1978, pp. 134-136 passim).

Early Descriptions of the Trinity

5/8/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/8/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 4: The Divine Triad." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition." (pp. 83-108). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly observes that from the earliest period, Christians have been staunchly monotheistic, confessing one all powerful God who created and sustains all things (Kelly 1978, p. 83). After about the middle of the second century there are some hints of secular philosophical thought creeping into Christian writings (Kelly 1978, p. 84). In the instances Kelly notes, there is some acknowledgement of the secular philosophies moving in a right (or wrong) direction, and clarification or refutation made in the terminology which would be used among the philosophers.
   The difficulty faced by the early Christians was how to articulate this one God who revealed himself through Jesus and poured out the Holy Spirit. Working with these three entities in such a way as to fit with the concept of one and only one God was a challenge (Kelly 1978, p. 87). The clear articulation of "one God existing in three co-equal Persons" was not formally articulated and accepted until 381 at the Council of Constantinople (Kelly 1978, p. 88). In this chapter Kelly reviews the attempts at a trinitarian articulation up to 325 and the Council of Nicea. The descriptions of baptismal catechesis from the early period are particularly helpful in this regard. Irenaeus, the Didache, and Justin Martyr all describe baptism in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Kelly 1978, p. 89). Kelly discerns this as some sort of established liturgical form (Kelly 1978, p. 90). The threefold formula can also be found in early eucharistic prayers.
   Kelly observes that the Apostolic Fathers "appear as witnesses to the traditional faith rather than interpreters striving to understand it" (Kelly 1978, p. 90). Though they make few explanations, they assert theological stances which reflect a trinitarian point of view. A specific defense of the trinitarian theology is lacking, very likely because it was not the issue being addressed in the conflicts or explanations at hand. Kelly describes a number of these writings.
   In contrast to the Apostolic Fathers, the second century Apologists made specific attempts to defend doctrinal points of view (Kelly 1978, p. 95). Their monotheism was clear. In general, they tried to deal with the pre-existent and pre-incarnate Son by means of a category of Christ as the mind of the Father. This is a reasonable use of the Logos as described in John as well as in Philo (Kelly 1978, p. 96). Kelly illustrates these discussions particularly in the work of Justin. He then goes on to describe, in turn, Tatian (Kelly 1978, p. 98), Theophilus of Antioch (Kelly 1978, p. 99), and Athenagoras. Kelly notes that the Apologists are not systematic theologians. They use "the Father" for the unified Godhead. They use "the Son" not as the preincarnate Son, but as he becomes evident in the incarnation (Kelly 1978, p. 100). He goes on to say, "they lacked a technical vocabulary adequate for describing eternal distinctions within the Deity; but that they apprehended such distinctions admits of no doubt" (Kelly 1978, p. 101).
   The Apologists were focused on the nature of Christ in the Godhead. For this reason, Kelly observes they did not systematically build a case for the Trinity (Kelly 1978, p. 101). However, their discussion of the Godhead routinely fell into triads, indicating a Trinitarian point of view in the Church. At times, the apologists will make statements about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and will use language of distinction in order. However, Kelly thinks this does not refer to subordination but rather to a distinction of operations (Kelly 1978, pp. 104-105). Kelly describes this in some detail. At its root, this view shows the persons of the Trinity all to be divine but to work in different ways. It also affirms that all the persons are equally one God.

Scripture - recognized, not imposed

5/1/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/1/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 3: The Scriptures." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition." (pp. 52-79). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   Kelly notes that by the apostolic period, though the collection was not articulated as such, the Old Testament was agreed upon by Jews, and was quickly recognized by most Christians as their authoritative works as well (Kelly 1978, p. 52). The early Christians seem to have used the Septuagint including what we would now consider the Apocrypha rather than the more restricted Masoretic Text (Kelly 1978, p.
54). The Apocrypha were less favorably received in the East than in the West. By the fourth century those works were regularly removed from readings in the East. In the West, in most settings, they were included as Scripture (Kelly 1978, p. 55).
   New Testament writings were recognized as Scripture at a very early period. Kelly cites Marcion, the second century heretic, as being the person who compelled Christians to make formal lists of what works belonged to a New Testament (Kelly 1978, p. 57). Kelly, evaluating this activity, notes that there is evidence of some recognized corpus of the New Testament prior to Marcion (Kelly 1978, p. 58). In any case, Marcion's rejection of some writings suggests a known collection from which some parts could be rejected. Kelly notes that the first actual list we have of our current New Testament works comes from Athanasius in 367, and that there was still ongoing debate about the contents into the sixth century (Kelly 1978, p. 60).
   Kelly notes that Christianity adopted a view of inspiration of Scripture from Judaism and quickly applied it to the New Testament writings as well as the Old (Kelly 1978, p. 61). The nature of inspiration as understood by the patristic authors was generally that the writers were taken into an ecstatic state and had little or no control of how they wrote what they did (Kelly 1978, p. 62). After the rise of Montanism, however, Christian interpreters tended to assign more personal care and consciousness to the biblical authors (Kelly 1978, p. 63).
   Issues of biblical interpretation were of considerable importance in early Christianity. In particular, the relationship of the Old and New Testaments was a matter of discussion (Kelly 1978, p. 64). A key interpretive element is seen in the canonical gospels as Chrsit and the evangelists treat the Old Testament as a Christian book, describing the Messiah (Kelly 1978, p. 65). This, then, is the pattern found in Acts and the epistles. A similar interpretation can be found in the post-apostolic authors as well. At times the interpretation of the Old Testament's symbolic references to Christ becomes more allegorical than most modern Chrsitians would like. Kelly describes a passage in the epistle of Barnabas (as interpreted by C.H. Dodd According to the Scriptures 1952, p. 9) in which Abraham's 318 servants show Christ. The Greek number 18 is IH, a common abbreviation of "Jesus." The number 300 is T, which looks like a cross (Kelly 1978, p. 66). Kelly goes on to note that such allegorical readings were not universal. There is a harmony between the Old and New Testaments. However, in general, the New Testament came to be seen as making the implications of the Old Testament more clear.
   Typology and allegory are terms normally used to describe interpretive methods. Kelly suggests avoiding the term "allegory" as it is understood differently now than it was in the patristic period (Kelly 1978, p. 70). In allegory, the details of a narrative itself play a relatively unimportant role, as they intend to symbolize other spiritual truths. The exegete's job is to identify these spiritual truths and explain them. In contrast to allegorical reading, typological readings interpret the Old Testament events as prefiguring or anticipating those in the New Testament (Kelly 1978, p. 71). The historical context of a type was important in determining its fulfillment, or antitype.
   Kelly observes that while typological exegesis became very normal within Christian teaching, allegorical exegesis was problematic. This is particularly the case in dealing with Marcionism and the various Gnostic movements, as they could pick and choose allegorical symbols to prove whatever they wished (Kelly 1978, p. 72). Allegorical interpretation was used in orthodox ways, particularly in Alexandria. However, it opened interpretive doors which could prove problematic (Kelly 1978, p. 73).
   Kelly refers finally to a reaction against allegorical exegesis of every sort. This reaction was centered in Antioch during the fourth and fifth centuries (Kelly 1978, p. 75). These interpreters maintained that an adequate understanding of the text would be based on the facts of the text rather than a symbolic understanding of letters or numbers within the text. This emphasis led to typological interpretations but a rejection of allegory (Kelly 1978, p. 76). Symbolic language could be accepted as symbolic, but the Scriptures are normally located in literal times and events.

Tradition, Then Scripture

4/24/2025

Tuesday Scholarly Notes
4/24/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter Two: Tradition and Scripture." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition." (pp. 29-51). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
   The question of the source of Christian doctrine is an important one, in Kelly's estimation. At some point, probably by the end of the first century, principles to interpret writings and practices became evident. otherwise, it would not have been possible to distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy (Kelly 1978, p.29). In his evaluation, Kelly considers the salient factors to be Scripture and Tradition. There was a clear identification of the authoritative apostolic writings as well as a known and continuous flow of traditional interpretation at a fairly early time (Kelly 1978, p.30). Kelly emphasizes that tradition as understood by the church fathers referred to the authoritative delivery of interpretations, something which would not be separated from and placed in opposition to Scripture.
   Kelly's investigation into the interplay of Scripture and tradition focuses on the period up to the middle of the second century, when canonical Scripture and doctrinal orthodoxy can be seen as relatively well established (Kelly 1978, p.31). During this period, the Old Testament was recognized by Christians as a Christian book, testifying to the person and work of Christ (Kelly 1978, p.32). The exegetical practices which led to this conclusion were likewise accepted as normative. The methodology used can be traced to the apostolic witness, thus placing it as part and parcel of the Christian tradition. Kelly cites numerous examples of church fathers identifying the authority of the interpretive methods of the apostles. In Kelly's view, the early Church did not consider this authority to be limited to apostolic documents. Rather, the documents may well have been accepted because they were consistent with the interpretive models which came from the apostolic period (Kelly 1978, p.33). The "preaching, liturgical action and catechetical instruction" may well have carried as much weight as the documents of the New Testament (Kelly 1978, p.34).
   As the ideas of gnosticism gained traction, Kelly observes that the distinctions between orthodoxy and gnosticism became more clear (Kelly 1978, p.35). Representatives of orthodoxy increasingly pointed to apostolic ideas. Meanwhile, purveyors of gnosticism made reference or claims to possessing secret apostolic gnosis. Kelly particularly notes this as shown in the writings of Irenaeus and Tertullian. Their claims, counter to gnosticism, were centered on a body of interpretive tradition derived from known apostolic teaching. Kelly describes Irenaeus' understanding of tradition as "'the canon of the truth.' Byu this he meant, as his frequent allusions to and citations from it prove, a condensed summary, fluid in its wording but fixed in content, setting out the key-points of the Christian revelation in the form of a rule" (Kelly 1978, p.37). The New Testament Scriptures, in Irenaeus' view, serve as a subsequent commitment of this teaching, produced in writing (Kelly 1978, p.38). The written documents then could be used as a reference to weigh the tradition which had previously been delivered to the Church (Kelly 1978, p.39).
   The understanding of the interplay of Scripture and Tradition described in the second century above became further entrenched in the Church during the third and fourth centuries (Kelly 1978, p.41). Kelly notes two changes. First, as Gnosticism lost influence, authors became less involved in articulating doctrines on the basis of apostolic tradition, preferring to use the Scripture as authoritative documents. At the same time, interpretations of the content of tradition tended to become broader (Kelly 1978, p.341). Yet Kelly observes that works such as Hippolytus' Apostolic tradition still affirmed practice which was derived from the earliest days of Christianity and which cannot be found in the same terms within the New Testament (Kelly 1978, p.44). Kelly provides multiple examples of third and fourth century authors alleging that heretical interpretations of the New Testament could not have been made if the heretics had rightly understood the historic traditions (Kelly 1978, p.44-48).
   By the fifth century, Kelly finds the practice of reference to past orthodoxy in order to clarify interpretation of Scripture or practices to become increasingly common (Kelly 1978, p.48). Teachers of the past were viewed as sources of authoritative interpretation. Kelly observes, though, that these past luminaries were not considered authoritative on their own, but by token of their rightly understanding both Scripture and tradition (Kelly 1978, p.49). This, I note, allows for embracing the sola scriptura of the Reformation.

Pre-Existing Influences on Early Christian Doctrine

4/17/2025

Thursday Scholarly Notes
4/17/25

Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter I: The Background." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition." (pp. 3-28). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)

   Kelly's goal is to review doctrinal development from the end of the first century to the mid-fifth century (Kelly 1978, p. 3). The close of the first century marks the start of subapostolic development. The council of Chalcedon in 451 may well end this period of doctrinal creativity. Many issues central to Christianity were largely settled by this time.
   During the patristic period, Kelly sees a strong influence on Christianity coming from Judaism (Kelly 1978, p. 6). Especially at the start of the period, nearly all frameworks for thought were adapted from the world of Judaism. Kelly considers the two most important concepts to be the divine nature as consisting of separate persons but one nature, as well as the interest shown to angels (Kelly 1978, p. 7). Kelly notes that Philo of Alexandria and his interpretation of Platonic conceptions of deity had a profound influence on biblical interpretation, particularly on allegorical interpretations which could harmonize elements of philosophy and theology (Kelly 1978, p. 8). The concept of a logos, held as a creative and explanatory force, was prominent in Plato (Kelly 1978, p. 10). The connection between the divine logos and Plato's forms then becomes an important matter of consideration.
   The Roman Empire considered its classical religions to be significant. For this reason, Christianity arose in the context of a culturally religious atmosphere. Kelly observes that the Roman paganism had lost much of its practical power by the patristic period, but still was a source of cultural unification (Kelly 1978, p. 11). The rise of mystery religions with ceremonial meals and worship served as competitors of one another and of Christianity, also seen as an exotic, new religion (Kelly 1978, pp. 12-13).
   Greek philosophy, particularly Platonism and Stoicism, was influential, particularly among the educated elite (Kelly 1978, pp. 14-15). Particularly the Platonic theory of the non-sensible Forms was easily seen as analogous to a biblical concept of God. Kelly briefly summarizes Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic concepts which could influence Christian thought (Kelly 1978, pp. 16-20, passim). Kelly's synopsis of the philosophical viewpoints is particularly helpful as he makes brief mention by name of philosophers who emphasized particular concepts.
   Neoplatonism was characterized by a strong emphasis on the transcendence of God (Kelly 1978, pp. 20-21). These ideas, flourishing after about 200 A.D., could be interpreted as similar to Christian conception, especially regarding the persons of the Godhead. However, in significant ways, an interpretation of Christianity in Neo-Platonic terms leads directly to Gnosticism (Kelly 1978, p. 22).
   The various Gnostic groups were syncretistic in nature, drawing from a wide variety of sources, but always emphasizing the need for a sort of arcane knowledge (gnosis) which would lead to truth (Kelly 1978, p. 23). They typically articulated multiple levels of aeons, which served essentially as a pantheon. Some Gnostics have more affinity to orthodox Christianity than others. However, the entire system is deeply contradictory to Christianity (Kelly 1978, p. 26).