Tuesday Scholarly Notes
5/22/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 6: The Beginnings of Christology." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition. (pp. 138-162). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
Though the full issue of Christology was at the center of the Council of Nicea in 325, Kelly traces partial formulations of specific issues back to the apostolic period (Kelly 1978, p. 138). Jesus had nearly universally been considered both divine and human, a conviction rooted in the New Testament. The difficulty was in showing "how the two aspects could be held together in synthesis" (Kelly 1978, p. 139).
Kelly observes there were a number of heretical sects which emerged in the second century, denying the deity of Christ. These would include the Ebionites and the monarchian heretics (Kelly 1978, pp. 139-140). Some took the opposite tack, taking Jesus to be entirely divine and not actually human, such as the Docetists (Kelly 1978, p. 141). Much of Gnosticism can be taken similarly to deny the actual humanity of Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 142).
Counter to these errors, orthodoxy insisted on both the true divine and human natures being present in the one Jesus (Kelly 1978, p. 143). Kelly traces the idea of Jesus' full divinity and humanity to Barnabas, Hermas, and to Ignatius of Antioch, who was quite explicit about it (Kelly 1978, p. 144). Some authors tended to equate the pre-incarnate Christ with the Holy Spirit.
In Kelly's view, the second century Apologists provide rather little explanation of their view of Christ. He is treated as God and man, though at times the descriptions may come close to allowing accusations of modalism (Kelly 1978, p. 145). Incarnation and physical sufferings are acknowledged. However, the co-existence of the two natures in one person is not explained to any significant degree (Kelly 1978, p. 146).
The Christology of Irenaeus, in Kelly's estimation, is more strongly influenced by the apostles Paul and John than by the Apologists (Kelly 1978, p. 147). He emphasizes the unity of God and man in Jesus, rejecting the separation common in Gnostic thought. Christ must have a truly human bodily nature (Kelly 1978, p. 148). Otherwise he could not have served as the second Adam.
In the West, Kelly emphasizes the enormous influence of Hippolytus and Tertullian (Kelly 1978, p. 149). Hippolytus is clear that the Logos became flesh, putting on the entirety of human nature but without sin. This stands in sharp contrast to the Docetists. Yet Jesus remains the divine Logos, never surrendering that nature. Tertullian took a similar view. However, in his discussion, he preferred to say that Christ was made of 'two substances" (Kelly 1978, p. 150). This term could cause difficulty as the persons of the Godhead are now routinely described as one in "substance."
Tertullian's description, which is the first known attempt to describe the relationship of human and divine (Kelly 1978, p. 151), is that the Word was not transfigured into flesh, but that he "clothed" himself in flesh. God is immutable, so to become flesh he had to take on flesh. Jesus is at once both God and man. The paradoxes implied by this view are recognized by Tertullian, who finally embraces them (Kelly 1978, p. 152).
The Alexandrian school, represented by Clement, made attempts to defend the full divinity and humanity of Christ. However, terminology of attachment left Clement open to charges of Docetism (Kelly 1978, p. 154). he was, however, clear that Jesus was a real human with a real human body. Clement's soteriology was largely predicated on the identity of Jesus as the divine Logos, rather than on his humanity.
Origen also saw Jesus as entirely human while still being the divine Logos (Kelly 1978, p. 155). He viewed the unity of the divine and human to be unbreakable. Jesus possessed a whole human nature and full divinity. And Origen was clear that the divinity persists in the human (Kelly 1978, p. 156). Kelly observes that Origen was the first to use terminology of Jesus as God Incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 157). However, he did not consider the humanity of Jesus "either permanent or essential" (Kelly 1978, p. 157). While Origen was not Docetic, he considered Jesus' humanity to have fallen away after the resurrection.
After Origen, in the East there was hesitancy about the pre-existence of souls as well as a concern about the implications of introducing human mind into the divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 158). The unity of the Godhead was considered to be of necessity a unity of substance. For this reason it was much easier to admit of Jesus having a human body but not a human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 159). Kelly does observe that the discussions of this matter are fragmentary in nature (Kelly 1978, p. 159). The records are all from the fifth century, making it difficult to discern actual third century opinion. However, Kelly considers it clear that Origen was fairly quickly accused of holding adoptionist views (Kelly 1978, p. 160). Origen's view of the Christological problem was largely rejected, as it is unclear that the two natures were fully enduring in the one person (Kelly 1978, p. 161).
5/22/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 6: The Beginnings of Christology." in Early Christian Doctrines, Revised Edition. (pp. 138-162). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
Though the full issue of Christology was at the center of the Council of Nicea in 325, Kelly traces partial formulations of specific issues back to the apostolic period (Kelly 1978, p. 138). Jesus had nearly universally been considered both divine and human, a conviction rooted in the New Testament. The difficulty was in showing "how the two aspects could be held together in synthesis" (Kelly 1978, p. 139).
Kelly observes there were a number of heretical sects which emerged in the second century, denying the deity of Christ. These would include the Ebionites and the monarchian heretics (Kelly 1978, pp. 139-140). Some took the opposite tack, taking Jesus to be entirely divine and not actually human, such as the Docetists (Kelly 1978, p. 141). Much of Gnosticism can be taken similarly to deny the actual humanity of Christ (Kelly 1978, p. 142).
Counter to these errors, orthodoxy insisted on both the true divine and human natures being present in the one Jesus (Kelly 1978, p. 143). Kelly traces the idea of Jesus' full divinity and humanity to Barnabas, Hermas, and to Ignatius of Antioch, who was quite explicit about it (Kelly 1978, p. 144). Some authors tended to equate the pre-incarnate Christ with the Holy Spirit.
In Kelly's view, the second century Apologists provide rather little explanation of their view of Christ. He is treated as God and man, though at times the descriptions may come close to allowing accusations of modalism (Kelly 1978, p. 145). Incarnation and physical sufferings are acknowledged. However, the co-existence of the two natures in one person is not explained to any significant degree (Kelly 1978, p. 146).
The Christology of Irenaeus, in Kelly's estimation, is more strongly influenced by the apostles Paul and John than by the Apologists (Kelly 1978, p. 147). He emphasizes the unity of God and man in Jesus, rejecting the separation common in Gnostic thought. Christ must have a truly human bodily nature (Kelly 1978, p. 148). Otherwise he could not have served as the second Adam.
In the West, Kelly emphasizes the enormous influence of Hippolytus and Tertullian (Kelly 1978, p. 149). Hippolytus is clear that the Logos became flesh, putting on the entirety of human nature but without sin. This stands in sharp contrast to the Docetists. Yet Jesus remains the divine Logos, never surrendering that nature. Tertullian took a similar view. However, in his discussion, he preferred to say that Christ was made of 'two substances" (Kelly 1978, p. 150). This term could cause difficulty as the persons of the Godhead are now routinely described as one in "substance."
Tertullian's description, which is the first known attempt to describe the relationship of human and divine (Kelly 1978, p. 151), is that the Word was not transfigured into flesh, but that he "clothed" himself in flesh. God is immutable, so to become flesh he had to take on flesh. Jesus is at once both God and man. The paradoxes implied by this view are recognized by Tertullian, who finally embraces them (Kelly 1978, p. 152).
The Alexandrian school, represented by Clement, made attempts to defend the full divinity and humanity of Christ. However, terminology of attachment left Clement open to charges of Docetism (Kelly 1978, p. 154). he was, however, clear that Jesus was a real human with a real human body. Clement's soteriology was largely predicated on the identity of Jesus as the divine Logos, rather than on his humanity.
Origen also saw Jesus as entirely human while still being the divine Logos (Kelly 1978, p. 155). He viewed the unity of the divine and human to be unbreakable. Jesus possessed a whole human nature and full divinity. And Origen was clear that the divinity persists in the human (Kelly 1978, p. 156). Kelly observes that Origen was the first to use terminology of Jesus as God Incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 157). However, he did not consider the humanity of Jesus "either permanent or essential" (Kelly 1978, p. 157). While Origen was not Docetic, he considered Jesus' humanity to have fallen away after the resurrection.
After Origen, in the East there was hesitancy about the pre-existence of souls as well as a concern about the implications of introducing human mind into the divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 158). The unity of the Godhead was considered to be of necessity a unity of substance. For this reason it was much easier to admit of Jesus having a human body but not a human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 159). Kelly does observe that the discussions of this matter are fragmentary in nature (Kelly 1978, p. 159). The records are all from the fifth century, making it difficult to discern actual third century opinion. However, Kelly considers it clear that Origen was fairly quickly accused of holding adoptionist views (Kelly 1978, p. 160). Origen's view of the Christological problem was largely rejected, as it is unclear that the two natures were fully enduring in the one person (Kelly 1978, p. 161).
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