Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
2/27/19
Veith, Gene Edward. Modern Fascism: The Threat to the Judeo-Christian Worldview. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1993.
Chapter 5, “‘The Triumph of the Will’ Fascist Philosophy” pp. 78-93.
Veith notes that among the Nazis and other fascists there has been a significant contingent of college educated people, particularly learned in philosophy (Veith 1993, 78). It is a matter of concern that Nietzsche and Heidegger are both popular among university communities, as their ideas fueled Nazism. Veith questions whether the overall relationship between existentialism and fascism was, in fact, essential to their thought (Veith 1993, 79). It is clear that Nazism took power easily and was acceptable to its contemporary climate. Veith thinks this shows a problem of some sort with the climate. There is comelling reason to consider how the intellectual elite fueled the rise of Nazism.
Existential philosophy is predicated on a radical individual freedom. This would not seem to be compatible with a totalitarian system (Veith 1993, 80). However, both movements are connected through Nietzsche. Veith finds that existentialism consciously challenges the transcendent, rather focusing on the personal. Without an objective morality, the individual may be democratic or totalitarian. What is important is that the person be genuine. Since fascism also rejected transcendence, it tended to draw existentialists to itself. The streams of thought are, therefore, related (Veith 1993, 81).
Nietzsche was no nationalist. He rejected the radical anti-Semitism and the statism of the Nazis (Veith 1993, 81). However, he turned the intellectual elite against both practical and theoretical ideas of transcendence. This was imitated by the fascist movement. He objected intellectually to Jewish and Christian ethics, an objection which was taken to the physical level by the fascists. He argued against specific ethics such as compassion, which could prevent the elimination of the weak (Veith 1993, 82). He preferred nature to take its course and allow those who were not superior to die. This would allow a superior race to emerge and re-shape humanity and the world (Veith 1993, 83). Nietzsche’s focus on the concrete rather than the abstract required action to implement the world as he thought it should be. This is precisely what was done by the Nazis and other fascists (Veith 1993, 84).
Heidegger embraced the National Socialist viewpoint and held to Nietzsche’s ideals though framing them in a way Veith finds “more palatable” (Veith 1993, 85). He did this primarily by positing that with the death of God humans would have to seek out a more “hidden and uncertain” type of truth. Thus, questioning became more important than knowing so “knowledge is a matter of process, not content” (Veith 1993, 85). This metaphysical view has been widely accepted in higher education and philosophy. Veith recognizes that at first glance the idea is incompatible with subjection to authoritarian government, such as in fascism. However, “the fascists saw themselves as iconoclasts, interrogating the old order and boldly challenging all transcendent absolutes. That they themselves were authoritarians and forbade counter-questioning must not have seemed inconsistent” (Veith 1993, 86). Heidegger advocated the removal of academic freedom so as to create unity in the scholarly community. He wanted this to be done as an act of freedom of will, so as to pursue the good of the community, meaning that which was consistent with National Socialism (Veith 1993, 87). Heidegger was eventually removed from his post because he was too radical in persecuting Catholic groups. The bottom line of Heidegger’s philosophy was an ideal of a heroic nationalism which did away with all that is transcendent (Veith 1993, 89).
Existentialism exalts the human will as the creator of meaning. This is common to Nietzsche and Heidegger (Veith 1993, 89). When the community has one will, they can become fully authentic, but only provided their individuality is removed and they function as the collective (Veith 1993, 90). People are to be trained to function as a collective. Competing wills are not to be tolerated, so a forceful conquering of the individual is perfectly acceptable. Life therefore is a series of power struggles which pull dissenters into uniformity or, alternatively, eliminate them (Veith 1993, 91). By invoking the “triumph of the will” the Nazis also managed to supersede Luther’s theology articulated in The Bondage of the Will and show Nazism as the superior replacement to Luther. Veith briefly describes the Christian view of the fallen nature and bound will, which needs tob e made subject to God, rathe than being able to triumphy by itself (Veith 1993, 92). This is strikingly antithetical to the Nazi ideal of a triumphant will.
2/27/19
Veith, Gene Edward. Modern Fascism: The Threat to the Judeo-Christian Worldview. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1993.
Chapter 5, “‘The Triumph of the Will’ Fascist Philosophy” pp. 78-93.
Veith notes that among the Nazis and other fascists there has been a significant contingent of college educated people, particularly learned in philosophy (Veith 1993, 78). It is a matter of concern that Nietzsche and Heidegger are both popular among university communities, as their ideas fueled Nazism. Veith questions whether the overall relationship between existentialism and fascism was, in fact, essential to their thought (Veith 1993, 79). It is clear that Nazism took power easily and was acceptable to its contemporary climate. Veith thinks this shows a problem of some sort with the climate. There is comelling reason to consider how the intellectual elite fueled the rise of Nazism.
Existential philosophy is predicated on a radical individual freedom. This would not seem to be compatible with a totalitarian system (Veith 1993, 80). However, both movements are connected through Nietzsche. Veith finds that existentialism consciously challenges the transcendent, rather focusing on the personal. Without an objective morality, the individual may be democratic or totalitarian. What is important is that the person be genuine. Since fascism also rejected transcendence, it tended to draw existentialists to itself. The streams of thought are, therefore, related (Veith 1993, 81).
Nietzsche was no nationalist. He rejected the radical anti-Semitism and the statism of the Nazis (Veith 1993, 81). However, he turned the intellectual elite against both practical and theoretical ideas of transcendence. This was imitated by the fascist movement. He objected intellectually to Jewish and Christian ethics, an objection which was taken to the physical level by the fascists. He argued against specific ethics such as compassion, which could prevent the elimination of the weak (Veith 1993, 82). He preferred nature to take its course and allow those who were not superior to die. This would allow a superior race to emerge and re-shape humanity and the world (Veith 1993, 83). Nietzsche’s focus on the concrete rather than the abstract required action to implement the world as he thought it should be. This is precisely what was done by the Nazis and other fascists (Veith 1993, 84).
Heidegger embraced the National Socialist viewpoint and held to Nietzsche’s ideals though framing them in a way Veith finds “more palatable” (Veith 1993, 85). He did this primarily by positing that with the death of God humans would have to seek out a more “hidden and uncertain” type of truth. Thus, questioning became more important than knowing so “knowledge is a matter of process, not content” (Veith 1993, 85). This metaphysical view has been widely accepted in higher education and philosophy. Veith recognizes that at first glance the idea is incompatible with subjection to authoritarian government, such as in fascism. However, “the fascists saw themselves as iconoclasts, interrogating the old order and boldly challenging all transcendent absolutes. That they themselves were authoritarians and forbade counter-questioning must not have seemed inconsistent” (Veith 1993, 86). Heidegger advocated the removal of academic freedom so as to create unity in the scholarly community. He wanted this to be done as an act of freedom of will, so as to pursue the good of the community, meaning that which was consistent with National Socialism (Veith 1993, 87). Heidegger was eventually removed from his post because he was too radical in persecuting Catholic groups. The bottom line of Heidegger’s philosophy was an ideal of a heroic nationalism which did away with all that is transcendent (Veith 1993, 89).
Existentialism exalts the human will as the creator of meaning. This is common to Nietzsche and Heidegger (Veith 1993, 89). When the community has one will, they can become fully authentic, but only provided their individuality is removed and they function as the collective (Veith 1993, 90). People are to be trained to function as a collective. Competing wills are not to be tolerated, so a forceful conquering of the individual is perfectly acceptable. Life therefore is a series of power struggles which pull dissenters into uniformity or, alternatively, eliminate them (Veith 1993, 91). By invoking the “triumph of the will” the Nazis also managed to supersede Luther’s theology articulated in The Bondage of the Will and show Nazism as the superior replacement to Luther. Veith briefly describes the Christian view of the fallen nature and bound will, which needs tob e made subject to God, rathe than being able to triumphy by itself (Veith 1993, 92). This is strikingly antithetical to the Nazi ideal of a triumphant will.
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