Thursday Scholarly Notes
6/26/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 11: Fourth Century Christology." (pp. 280-309). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
In Kelly's view, the Nicene council did not deal comprehensively with the nature of Christ as incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 280). The problem discussed was, rather, the divine nature of the Father and the Son. In this chapter Kelly discusses fourth century Christology as it developed in the East, a more fertile bed for theological pursuits than the West. At issue was primarily whether Christ had a human soul or whether he was the divine Logos but possessing human flesh (Kelly 1978, p. 281).
In Arian thought, Christ was divine but possessed human flesh. However, his humanity was defective, as he did not have a fully human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 282). In contrast to this view were teachers from Antioch, particularly Eustathius, who sharply questioned the Arian commitment to Christ not having a human nature (Kelly 1978, p. 283). Athanasius, when involved in this discussion, pointed out that in the incarnation, Jesus still was transcendent and had sovereign power over all creation. Yet he was entirely human, having been born of a virgin and having taken on humanity, not merely physicality (Kelly 1978, p. 285). There is thus no dividing of God the Son into the one who is divine and the one who is human. It is the same God the Son who does miracles and who becomes hungry (Kelly 1978, p. 286). Yet Athanasius failed to confirm or deny the existence of a human soul in Jesus. He endorsed Jesus' mind, soul, and intelligence, but was not ready to separate these from the divine nature (Kelly 1978, p. 288).
The work of Apollinarius of Laodicea pushed the Alexandrian logic about the person of Christ to its limit (Kelly 1978, p. 289). He accordingly rejected the idea of a human mind in Jesus. This was a natural outcome of the thought that the eternal Word of God merely took on flesh, rather than taking on humanity (Kelly 1978, p. 290). Kelly cites Gregory of Nazianzus as rejecting Apollinarianism as a heresy which separates God the Son into two different beings, one the Son of God and the other the son of Mary (Kelly 1978, p. 290). This would effectively mean that Jesus, merely as a man, would be unable to save humans from sin (Kelly 1978, p. 291). Apollinarius saw Jesus as gaining life as the Word of God, thus the divine element making him able to live as if he were human. Jesus' real humanity was thus denied (Kelly 1978, p. 292).
Kelly observes that, though Apollinarius had engaged in brilliant logical analysis, he faced a swift and forceful response from more orthodox voices. In particular, he had failed to recognize "that to achieve man's salvation, the Only-begotten must have assumed a complete manhood" (Kelly 1978, p. 295). Accordingly, Apollinarius was condemned by a council at Rome in 377, by a synod in Alexandria in 378, and in Antioch in 379, then by the council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1978, p. 296). His view which forced a logical division of the divine and human natures in Christ and eventually denied the human nature rejected the picture given of Jesus in Scripture. Orthodoxy requires that God the Son be fully divine and fully human. While Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa differed in some of the outworking, they nonetheless took Jesus to be fully divine and fully human at the same time (Kelly 1978, p. 298).
Despite the rejection of Apollinarius, Kelly notes the Alexandrian school retained a conceptual framework based on the Word taking on flesh, yet possibly not having an entirely normal human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 302). It was in the Antiochene school, toward the end of the fourth century and the start of the fifth century, that this was articulated. These thinkers insisted that the incarnate God had an entirely normal human spirit and mind. Kelly discusses this view as articulated by Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia (Kelly 1978, pp. 302ff). Both were accused of Nestorianism due to the difficulty of maintaining that the deity and humanity of Christ were unmixed though not separable (Kelly 1978, p. 303). Moreso than Diodore, Theodore argued that the human nature of Christ was necessary in order for him to suffer from the weaknesses common to humanity. If he did not have a normal human nature, he would never suffer from hunger, thirst, or fatigue (Kelly 1978, p. 304). It was within this human nature that he was able t purchase salvation. The paradigm described, then, is not God the Son as the Word and flesh, but as the Word and man (Kelly 1978, p. 304). The two natures are fully present and cannot be separated, though, in theory, it is possible to draw some descriptive distinctions.
Theodore of Mopsuestia was roundly accused of holding the concepts of the later Nestorian heresy due to his willingness to accept, in theory, that the deity and humanity of Christ could be distinguished (Kelly 1978, p. 307). However, Kelly observes that much scholarly examination of his writings has shown that he was no kind of Nestorian. He was unwilling to accept any attempt to separate the two natures in Christ. God the Son, in the incarnation, remains one person, though with two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 308).
6/26/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 11: Fourth Century Christology." (pp. 280-309). Harper: San Francisco. (Personal Library)
In Kelly's view, the Nicene council did not deal comprehensively with the nature of Christ as incarnate (Kelly 1978, p. 280). The problem discussed was, rather, the divine nature of the Father and the Son. In this chapter Kelly discusses fourth century Christology as it developed in the East, a more fertile bed for theological pursuits than the West. At issue was primarily whether Christ had a human soul or whether he was the divine Logos but possessing human flesh (Kelly 1978, p. 281).
In Arian thought, Christ was divine but possessed human flesh. However, his humanity was defective, as he did not have a fully human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 282). In contrast to this view were teachers from Antioch, particularly Eustathius, who sharply questioned the Arian commitment to Christ not having a human nature (Kelly 1978, p. 283). Athanasius, when involved in this discussion, pointed out that in the incarnation, Jesus still was transcendent and had sovereign power over all creation. Yet he was entirely human, having been born of a virgin and having taken on humanity, not merely physicality (Kelly 1978, p. 285). There is thus no dividing of God the Son into the one who is divine and the one who is human. It is the same God the Son who does miracles and who becomes hungry (Kelly 1978, p. 286). Yet Athanasius failed to confirm or deny the existence of a human soul in Jesus. He endorsed Jesus' mind, soul, and intelligence, but was not ready to separate these from the divine nature (Kelly 1978, p. 288).
The work of Apollinarius of Laodicea pushed the Alexandrian logic about the person of Christ to its limit (Kelly 1978, p. 289). He accordingly rejected the idea of a human mind in Jesus. This was a natural outcome of the thought that the eternal Word of God merely took on flesh, rather than taking on humanity (Kelly 1978, p. 290). Kelly cites Gregory of Nazianzus as rejecting Apollinarianism as a heresy which separates God the Son into two different beings, one the Son of God and the other the son of Mary (Kelly 1978, p. 290). This would effectively mean that Jesus, merely as a man, would be unable to save humans from sin (Kelly 1978, p. 291). Apollinarius saw Jesus as gaining life as the Word of God, thus the divine element making him able to live as if he were human. Jesus' real humanity was thus denied (Kelly 1978, p. 292).
Kelly observes that, though Apollinarius had engaged in brilliant logical analysis, he faced a swift and forceful response from more orthodox voices. In particular, he had failed to recognize "that to achieve man's salvation, the Only-begotten must have assumed a complete manhood" (Kelly 1978, p. 295). Accordingly, Apollinarius was condemned by a council at Rome in 377, by a synod in Alexandria in 378, and in Antioch in 379, then by the council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1978, p. 296). His view which forced a logical division of the divine and human natures in Christ and eventually denied the human nature rejected the picture given of Jesus in Scripture. Orthodoxy requires that God the Son be fully divine and fully human. While Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa differed in some of the outworking, they nonetheless took Jesus to be fully divine and fully human at the same time (Kelly 1978, p. 298).
Despite the rejection of Apollinarius, Kelly notes the Alexandrian school retained a conceptual framework based on the Word taking on flesh, yet possibly not having an entirely normal human soul (Kelly 1978, p. 302). It was in the Antiochene school, toward the end of the fourth century and the start of the fifth century, that this was articulated. These thinkers insisted that the incarnate God had an entirely normal human spirit and mind. Kelly discusses this view as articulated by Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia (Kelly 1978, pp. 302ff). Both were accused of Nestorianism due to the difficulty of maintaining that the deity and humanity of Christ were unmixed though not separable (Kelly 1978, p. 303). Moreso than Diodore, Theodore argued that the human nature of Christ was necessary in order for him to suffer from the weaknesses common to humanity. If he did not have a normal human nature, he would never suffer from hunger, thirst, or fatigue (Kelly 1978, p. 304). It was within this human nature that he was able t purchase salvation. The paradigm described, then, is not God the Son as the Word and flesh, but as the Word and man (Kelly 1978, p. 304). The two natures are fully present and cannot be separated, though, in theory, it is possible to draw some descriptive distinctions.
Theodore of Mopsuestia was roundly accused of holding the concepts of the later Nestorian heresy due to his willingness to accept, in theory, that the deity and humanity of Christ could be distinguished (Kelly 1978, p. 307). However, Kelly observes that much scholarly examination of his writings has shown that he was no kind of Nestorian. He was unwilling to accept any attempt to separate the two natures in Christ. God the Son, in the incarnation, remains one person, though with two natures (Kelly 1978, p. 308).
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