Thursday Scholarly Notes
6/12/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 9: The Nicene Crisis." (pp. 223-251). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
Kelly takes the start of the fourth century to open a new phase of the development of Christian doctrine. In this period the question of the nature of the Godhead came to the fore, serving to spur attempts to articulate the doctrine of the Trinity (Kelly 1978, p. 223). At the opening of the fourth century, we have little information about a Western view of the place of the Word in the godhead. In the East, the emphasis had primarily been on divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 224). The distinctions were held as mysterious and didn't receive much discussion.
In the first third of the fourth century, Alexander of Alexandria, while affirming the unity of the Godhead, still asserted that the Word, while uncreated, served as a mediator between God and creation (Kelly 1978, p. 224). While the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and cannot be separated from the Father, he is, in some way, not completely identical to the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 225). In contrast to Alexander, Eusebius considers the Word to be God, yet he is hesitant to appeal to co-eternity (Kelly 1978, p. 226). Eusebius will affirm that the Father and Son share an identical glory.
Arius, a presbyter from Alexandria, entered into this discussion in the decade before 324 (Kelly 1978, p. 226). He was clear that the Father was ingenerate, eternal, and without beginning. Because God is never changing, Arius considered it impossible that he could share in substance with any other being, as that would diminish him (Kelly 1978, p. 227). For this reason, Arius believed it necessary that the Son must be created. This resulted in a doctrine of the Son as not self-existent, not eternal, and differing from the Father in his essence (Kelly 1978, p. 228). In short, the Son is finite, while the Father is infinite. This subjects the Son to accusations of change and even sin (Kelly 1978, p. 229).
Arius' teaching gained some traction for several years, though Kelly observes that it would not have been broadly acceptable in the East or West. Receiving notice from Constantine in 324, the move toward unity of doctrine resulted in the council of Nicea in 325 (Kelly 1978, p. 231). The creedal statement, which is essentially that which we use today, was to receive elaboration of the third article at a later date. It also included a statement anathematizing several specific statements of Arian thought (Kelly 1978, p. 232). Subsequently, Athanasius wrote a number of treatises to refute Arius' claims. Kelly notes that in many ways the Nicene Creed engages in negative teaching. The positive theological teachings intended are more difficult to articulate (Kelly 1978, p. 233). The statements about the substance of the Son, however, are clear. At issue, in Kelly's opinion, is the extent to which the Creed rejected Origen's understanding of the nature of οὐσία in the Son (Kelly 1978, p. 234). It was understood by later theologians that the Father and the Son have an identical nature. It is not entirely clear what Origen had intended in using that language.
In the twenty years or so after the council of Nicea, Arianism continued to be a matter of serious debate (Kelly 1978, p. 237). Ariaans who had been exiled continued to teach, and to return into the empire. Some were able to depose and even exile supporters of the Nicene faith (Kelly 1978, p. 238). Eventually, however, the council of Constantinople in 381 reaffirmed the Nicean faith. Kelly describes the polemics in use during the period in some detail (Kelly 1978, p. 239).
The Nicene party included radical and more moderate elements. Kelly describes the more radical element as leaning toward a Sabellian point of view in which the Logos cannot be distinguished from the Father in any meaningful way (Kelly 1978, p. 240). Athanasius strikes Kelly as a more moderate adherent to the nicene faith. His affirmation that the Son must be fully divine was not remotely Sabellian in nature. Rather, salvation is possible only if the Son is just as divine as the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 243). On this account, Athanasius would condemn Arian thought. Because the Father is eternal and uncreated, not limited by time, so the Son is eternal and uncreated (Kelly 1978, p. 244). The Son is distinct from the Father, but is of the same nature.
In opposition to the Nicene party, Kelly identifies three parties (Kelly 1978, p. 247). One was conciliatory in tone but consistently left ways an Arian could remain in fellowship with orthodoxy. For example, the united will of the Godhead, or the fact that the Son was begotten outside of time would be emphasized (Kelly 1978, p. 248). Another party was specifically and unabashedly Arian, often manifest in "a neo-Platonic metaphysic of three hierarchically ordered, mutually exclusive οὐσίαι" (Kelly 1978, p. 249). Finally, there was a group sometimes (unfairly) described as Semi-Arian (Kelly 1978, p. 249). They preferred to take no definitive stand on the nature of the generation of the Son. These parties in opposition to Nicene piety generally dissipated toward the end of the fourth century (Kelly 1978, p. 251).
6/12/25
Kelly, J.N.D. (1978). "Chapter 9: The Nicene Crisis." (pp. 223-251). Harper San Francisco. (Personal Library)
Kelly takes the start of the fourth century to open a new phase of the development of Christian doctrine. In this period the question of the nature of the Godhead came to the fore, serving to spur attempts to articulate the doctrine of the Trinity (Kelly 1978, p. 223). At the opening of the fourth century, we have little information about a Western view of the place of the Word in the godhead. In the East, the emphasis had primarily been on divine unity (Kelly 1978, p. 224). The distinctions were held as mysterious and didn't receive much discussion.
In the first third of the fourth century, Alexander of Alexandria, while affirming the unity of the Godhead, still asserted that the Word, while uncreated, served as a mediator between God and creation (Kelly 1978, p. 224). While the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and cannot be separated from the Father, he is, in some way, not completely identical to the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 225). In contrast to Alexander, Eusebius considers the Word to be God, yet he is hesitant to appeal to co-eternity (Kelly 1978, p. 226). Eusebius will affirm that the Father and Son share an identical glory.
Arius, a presbyter from Alexandria, entered into this discussion in the decade before 324 (Kelly 1978, p. 226). He was clear that the Father was ingenerate, eternal, and without beginning. Because God is never changing, Arius considered it impossible that he could share in substance with any other being, as that would diminish him (Kelly 1978, p. 227). For this reason, Arius believed it necessary that the Son must be created. This resulted in a doctrine of the Son as not self-existent, not eternal, and differing from the Father in his essence (Kelly 1978, p. 228). In short, the Son is finite, while the Father is infinite. This subjects the Son to accusations of change and even sin (Kelly 1978, p. 229).
Arius' teaching gained some traction for several years, though Kelly observes that it would not have been broadly acceptable in the East or West. Receiving notice from Constantine in 324, the move toward unity of doctrine resulted in the council of Nicea in 325 (Kelly 1978, p. 231). The creedal statement, which is essentially that which we use today, was to receive elaboration of the third article at a later date. It also included a statement anathematizing several specific statements of Arian thought (Kelly 1978, p. 232). Subsequently, Athanasius wrote a number of treatises to refute Arius' claims. Kelly notes that in many ways the Nicene Creed engages in negative teaching. The positive theological teachings intended are more difficult to articulate (Kelly 1978, p. 233). The statements about the substance of the Son, however, are clear. At issue, in Kelly's opinion, is the extent to which the Creed rejected Origen's understanding of the nature of οὐσία in the Son (Kelly 1978, p. 234). It was understood by later theologians that the Father and the Son have an identical nature. It is not entirely clear what Origen had intended in using that language.
In the twenty years or so after the council of Nicea, Arianism continued to be a matter of serious debate (Kelly 1978, p. 237). Ariaans who had been exiled continued to teach, and to return into the empire. Some were able to depose and even exile supporters of the Nicene faith (Kelly 1978, p. 238). Eventually, however, the council of Constantinople in 381 reaffirmed the Nicean faith. Kelly describes the polemics in use during the period in some detail (Kelly 1978, p. 239).
The Nicene party included radical and more moderate elements. Kelly describes the more radical element as leaning toward a Sabellian point of view in which the Logos cannot be distinguished from the Father in any meaningful way (Kelly 1978, p. 240). Athanasius strikes Kelly as a more moderate adherent to the nicene faith. His affirmation that the Son must be fully divine was not remotely Sabellian in nature. Rather, salvation is possible only if the Son is just as divine as the Father (Kelly 1978, p. 243). On this account, Athanasius would condemn Arian thought. Because the Father is eternal and uncreated, not limited by time, so the Son is eternal and uncreated (Kelly 1978, p. 244). The Son is distinct from the Father, but is of the same nature.
In opposition to the Nicene party, Kelly identifies three parties (Kelly 1978, p. 247). One was conciliatory in tone but consistently left ways an Arian could remain in fellowship with orthodoxy. For example, the united will of the Godhead, or the fact that the Son was begotten outside of time would be emphasized (Kelly 1978, p. 248). Another party was specifically and unabashedly Arian, often manifest in "a neo-Platonic metaphysic of three hierarchically ordered, mutually exclusive οὐσίαι" (Kelly 1978, p. 249). Finally, there was a group sometimes (unfairly) described as Semi-Arian (Kelly 1978, p. 249). They preferred to take no definitive stand on the nature of the generation of the Son. These parties in opposition to Nicene piety generally dissipated toward the end of the fourth century (Kelly 1978, p. 251).
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