Category: Sommerville-2006 - Wittenberg Door Campus Ministry

Time for Respect

1/23/2019

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
1/23/19
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 12, “A Vision of the Future” pp. 143-144.

In his brief closing remarks Sommerville asks the reader to imagine universities which welcome both secular and religious viewpoints, which are willing to explore humans and human nature in depth, and which seek to encourage all students to discover the roots of their cultures and beliefs. Such a place could actually pursue questions of morality, truth, and inquiry that would be neutral about religion, rather than being opposed to it (Sommerville 2006, 143). Sommerville suggests it could start with requsts that students and their views be treated with respect, even if they have religious convictions. It would also help if those with specific religious convictions made the relevance of those convictions clear. Inviting all people into the discussion is a valuable way of restoring the relevancy of our academic institutions (Sommerville 2006, 144).

Popular Versus Permanent

1/16/2019

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
1/16/19
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 11, “Postsecularism and the University” pp. 135-141.

Sommerville asserts that a hundred years ago, and even as recently as the 1960s, there was some cultural agreement about what was important. “So critics argued such amtters from some principle that seemed convincing, like rality or sincerity. At least in looking back they thought they could discern an arrow of development and a canon of classics in art and thought” (Sommerville 2006, 135). However, by the 1990s academia had largely isolated itself from society at large. Discussion within institutions was devolving into shrill arguments. Sommerville takes this effect to come largely from a lack of agreement on ruling principles (Sommerville 2006, 136). Schools at all levels have emphasized diversity to the extent that they consistently attack any common culture, breaking up all ideas of social cohesion (Sommerville 2006, 137). The lack of cohesion is also likely driven b y the daily nature of the news cycle, which prevents us from thoughtful and in-depth analysis of ideas. Through this propcess we expect a new world and a new set of interests and priorities daily (Sommerville 2006, 138). Sadly, the universities have embraced the frequent changes of priorities. While the world of academia was designed to be set apart from the momentary, it is now embracing the short-term vagaries of the media’s interest. The deadlines and the brevity of analysis, normally making sound bite citations in under 20 seconds, prevents thoughtful discourse (Sommerville 2006, 139).

In the process of pursuing the popular, cultural thought is pulled apart with no forces left to put it back together. The secular academic rationalism has proven unable or unwilling to do so. At the same time, a secularist bias in academia shuts religious voices out of the intellectual world (Sommerville 2006, 140). Sommerville suggest that the intellectuals within the world of religion, those who have not merely followed the dictates of entertainment-based media models, need to keep speaking up and engaging in educated discussion of real issues (Sommerville 2006, 141). This could be a key factor in restoring religious discourse to academic life.

Religion and Science Use Different Methods to Explore the Same Realities

1/9/2019

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
1/9/19
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 10, “How Religious Scholars Could Contribute” pp. 121-133.

Sommerville concedes that religious voices have not been speaking within academia for some time. While some religious people wish to have their voice heard as a matter of equal access, Sommerville’s contention is on different grounds. Because secularism has not accomplished the goals set forth about a hundred years ago, religious voices need to be heard as a good faith attempt to achieve those goals (Sommerville 2006, 121). Unfortunately, “religion has seemed to be devoid of intellectual merit. Religious views on important questions have not developed and have become nearly invisible” (Sommerville 2006, 122). It may be that different philosophies would end up approaching problems in different ways. This could require extensive adjustment in the structure of a university. Sommerville also concedes that religious scholars may not immediately be prepared to approach their disciplines with their religious ideas in full operation (Sommerville 2006, 123). However, there are examples of religious thinkers who are able to approach their disciplines in a way consistent with their faith. At the same time, Sommerville is clear that we do not prefer religious points of view simply because they are religious. We prefer points of view which are superior to others (Sommerville 2006, 124).

Sommerville further proposes that scholars who are religious need to consider how they enter dialogue (Sommerville 2006, 125). Traditional theological terms are not always easy to relate to current debates. The language of the existing discipline provides a starting point for ongoing discussion. It is important to find the connection points for philosophical debate and analysis (Sommerville 2006, 126).

Another factor Sommerville recognizes is that discussion of religious connections may be better handled using the language of perspectives rather than binding propositions. Sommerville illustrates some different methods of argumentation so the reader will see the difference (Sommerville 2006, 128). The essence of the discussion is to uncover assumptions and expose them to careful consideration. Sommerville considers elements of religion to be a natural and important part of that process (Sommerville 2006, 129). He even goes so far as to illustrate that the basic way we consider history and research is based on Christian, not pagan, methods, ideals, and assumptions. We assume a basic linear pattern, a moral agency in actors, and that there are selfish motives in every actor, among other things. These would not be the assumptions of a Greek or Roman in antiquity. Our human categories are based on religious assumptions, and in the West, those assumptions bear a similarity to Christianity (Sommerville 2006, 130). The religious categories allow us to explore assumptions.

Sommerville considers possible reasons for an academic attitude dismissing religion. He thinks it often comes from insecurity on the part of the professors. They may be avoiding difficult philosophical questions because those questions culd threaten their assumptions. Christians have taken the dismissal of their views as a sign that their scholarship is not welcome. Sommerville suggests reconciliation may occur when Christians form study centers at universities so as toengage ideas in a serious manner (Sommerville 2006, 132).

Tolerance vs. Moralizing

1/2/2019

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
1/2/19
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 9. “Moralizing as a Bad Habit” pp. 111-119.

With the emphasis on tolerance in academia we might expect the university to be an amoral atmosphere. Sommerville, however, finds it to be a place full of moralizting, which he distinguishes from actual applied ethics. “Moralizing is blaming others, while ethics is examining ourselves” (Sommerville 2006, 111). Even though the academy will oppose “imposing morality,” it assumes some sort of existing values, then builds on those to enforce a moralistic standard (Sommerville 2006, 112). Here, religion could be a strong force for unity of standards, but it is rejected because it is not shared by all. This leaves the community in the position of creating standards with less than concrete reasons attached. Sommerville notes that in history, his discipline, tracing moral right and wrong is a very important motivation for continued study. Since the rise of social science in the 1960s, he has found a reaction against the purely quantitative approaches advocated by that movement (Sommerville 2006, 113). The result has been a greater emphasis on narrative elements, which normally elevate the role of moral values in people and movements. These values cannot be explained through naturalistic processes, but must deal with volition, motivation, and agency, which are deeply laden with values (Sommerville 2006, 114). This is a problem simply because, in an academic climate which rejects “oppression and the belittling of others” (Sommerville 2006, 115), there is a parallel hesitancy regarding ethics and moral formation in traditional terms. True humanizing of history, as well as other disciplines, requires a willingness to explore both ethical and religious questions (Sommerville 2006, 116).

Sommerville goes on to speak of two different forms of tolerance, which may be easily confused with one another. There is a moral value of tolerance for persons. However, tolerance of ideas is not a moral value. Sommerville rather identifies it as “intellectual relativism” (Sommerville 2006, 116). The confusion may come about due to an assumption that people’s ideas are intrinsic parts of them, and therefore cannot change. If this is the working assumption, an attack on an idea constitutes an attack against the person (Sommerville 2006, 117). Sommerville suggests that a way of breaking the confusion is a study of history which confronts students with a reasoned account of why proponents of different value systems considered themselves to be right. Developing a thorough understanding of multiple points of view is essential in learning to choose among them. Sommerville finds that the moralism coming from the secular university is too one-sided to allow for development of understanding of different viewpoints (Sommerville 2006, 119).

A Sense of History

12/26/2018

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
12/26/18
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 8, “Losing a Sense of History” pp. 97-109.

Sommerville, long a professor of Western Civilization, expresses concern over the decline of courses in the humanities focused on the successes of the West (Sommerville 2006, 97). In his past, a study of history and the humanities was understood as a way of learning the good humans are capable of. Specifically, he observes that Western culture has a history of approaching problems differently from the rest of the world, and with remarkable success. However, since the late 1960s or early 1970s, students and scholars have seen less intrinsic need for a study of what makes a civilization great (Sommerville 2006, 98).

Tracing the history of changes in attitude toward Western Civilization, Sommerville finds a decline roughly corresponding to the broadening access to college education beginning in the late 1800s, as the overall pattern of a classical curriculum broke down in favor of more elective options which might appeal to a less elite student body (Sommerville 2006, 99). During and after World War II, departments shifted their emphasis increasingly to pragmatic and ethical considerations which could seem more relevant. Especially at University of Chicago and institutions which followed their lead, courses in critical thinking and social science became more prominent than those in Western Civilization (Sommerville 2006, 100). The academy increasingly avoided “dead white Europeans.” The issue was of great importance because “students representing the previously neglected groups were entering the university with a sense of grievance” (Sommerville 2006, 100). On the contrary, Sommerville notes that all courses are incomplete by nature, that they are intended to help students seek out a good framework to ask questions, and that a study of one’s own (majority) culture provided a framework to investigate others (Sommerville 2006, 101).

As a replacement to Western Civilization, Sommerville finds universities are studying World History. However, different academics define the discipline in various ways. Sommerville does not think it common for a university to treat World History as “a brief survey of all the world’s civilizations” (Sommerville 2006, 101-102). In an acdemic climate of diversity, every group which has felt ignored by the academy will try to emphasize its own distinctives. Sommerville believes this requires too much of scholars. “We have not yet created a rationale for learning about others before we’ve learned about ourselves. The point in studying others is presumably to get another perspective on ourselves (Sommerville 2006, 102).

Sommerville next ties secularism into the picture, as the historical movement which sets out to destroy traditions (Sommerville 2006, 103). A course in Western Civilization pursues understanding of the majority culture in this hemisphere. The course in World History attempts to devalue that culture in favor of a smattering of others. Meanwhile, Sommerville alleges that a great many of the cultural institutions we and our students take for granted are religious in nature, thus not comprehensible in a fully secularized society (Sommerville 2006, 104).

Sommerville explores the interaction between the religious and secular by considering the 2004 juxtaposition of Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code and Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ. Brown, claiming to be writing historical fiction but saying much of the information is true, presents many patently false ideas as true (Sommerville 2006, 105). However, Brown’s claims were largely debunked by non-academic writers. Universities have made virtually no effort to clarify the historical record (Sommerville 2006, 107).

On the contrary, universities responded to Gibson’s work specifically because he was faithful to the historical sources we possess in The Passion of the Christ. Rather than offering his use of historic records of Jesus’ trial, they attacked it, after reversing their previous, published, opinions (Sommerville 2006, 107). In effect, because Gibson’s work was offensive by demonstrating adherence to a well documented religious tradition, it was rejected out of hand.

Sommerville concludes that, though the reality of Western prominence is troublesome to many, it should still be treated as real. It deserves careful study and consideration (Sommerville 2006, 109).

Do we teach about it, or do we teach it?

12/19/2018

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
12/19/18
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 7, “Teaching About Secularism, or Teaching Secularism?” pp. 85-96.

In 1963 the United States Surpeme Court ruled that tax-supported schools could teach “about” religion. Sommerville takes this to be a view from the outside which undermines claims that the religion itself has legitimacy (Sommerville 2006, 85). The likely presupposition was that the secular was natural and normal, a neutral position which could rise above all else. However, secularism is now appearing more like only one of many manners in which we can conceive this world. It is therefore something which can be considered carefully as one of many traditions. Rather than doing so, Sommerville says “universities and the public schools have been teaching secularism in the sense of indoctrination and requiring the adoption of its assumptions” (Sommerville 2006, 86). He counters that, to be fair, universities should teach about secularism as one of many competing worldviews. One of many difficulties in such an effort is defining the difference between secularization, in which religion is separated from other aspects of life, and secularism, in which religion is excluded altogether (Sommerville 2006, 87).

Sommerville identifies a decline in the authority of universities, which he ties strongly to their insistence on secularism. The authoritative voice of the university has mostly been taken over by think tanks and a variety of news and talk media (Sommerville 2006, 88). The academy in general has disconnected from the averate American, who doesn’t find secularism to be required for intelligence or for recognition of the importance of science.

In publis schools, secujlarism first strove for tolerance, acceptance of people who are different, particularly in religion or other cultural elements. Sommerville finds the emphasis on tolerance now to be making moves against secularism, as we realize many immigrant populations are very dedicated to their religious points of view (Sommerville 2006, 89). Tolerance allows religion, rather than forcing it out, as secularism does. Sommerville suggests that as secondary schools spread along with the message of tolerance, we found a democratization of education in which the more erudite elements of society, including secularism, were washed out and tended to disappear (Sommerville 2006, 90).

Sommerville also finds that the explosion of daily media and the faster news cycle fights against secularism. The slightly abstruse world of the secularist doesn’t get a hearing among entertainment-motivated people (Sommerville 2006, 90-91).

The courts were envisioned as a bastion of secularism as well. Sommerville notes a pattern of the courts to protect nonreligious people from exposure to religious messages while purposely requiring religious students to endure overtly anti-religious messages (Sommerville 2006, 91). In recent years the courts have begun to conclude that teaching about religion is an appropriate and even necessary activity. Sommerville continues to advocate for teaching abou secularism as well (Sommerville 2006, 92).

Sommerville observes hat it is important that tax-supported groups should not impose religioon on others (Sommerville 2006, 93). There is a compelling question about whether religion would be able to contribute to intellectual debate (Sommerville 2006, 94). In fact, sommerville doesn’t see religion as normally entering into discussions so as to bring certain proof of its doctrines. However, it is important to allow religion to bring perspective to debates. This is likely the purpose of the First Amendment free exercise clause, which protects the right of poeple and groups to express religious points of view (Sommerville 2006, 95). It would therefore be appropriate to allow all religions and philosophies, including a secular philosophy, to have free access to discussion of ideas.

Science Gets Strange

12/12/2018

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
12/12/18
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 6, “Science Gets Strange” pp. 75-84.

Sommerville, discussing the history of science, finds that scientists recently fall into religious language to express the wonders they have identified and their curiosity about what is yet to be found. He then makes a useful distinction. “”In English usage, ‘science’ is our term for those aspects of reality which we can bring under our explanatory models, while ‘religion’ is our term for that which transcends the ordinary and for its demands on us” (Sommerville 2006, 75). Though both science and religion can claim to be real, they cannot be investigated by the same means. Yet they must be investigated. Sommerville goes on to cite numerous scientists who have openly said the urge to explore science comes from religious motivations (Sommerville 2006, 76). Additionally, he observes that many “treatments of physics or cosmology” for popular audiences conclude with philosophical or religious discourses of one kind or another (Sommerville 2006, 78).

The reason for this philosophical or religious discussion may well be tied to the fact that scientific inquiry often leads in directions which seem strange. Systems we picture as reliable and simple often turn out to be very intricate and not very predictable. Sommerville also notes among these scientific oddities that the universe itself does not appear all that complex compared to a human being, and that it seems to have no sort of conscious self-awareness, but is explained by humans instead (Sommerville 2006, 79). One of the compelling issues in finding religious undertones in science is what we call “anthropic coincidences.” These are special conditions by which human life and intelligence could be found, but which would often seem to be merely a matter of random chance. Sommerville mentions for example the size of the universe being just right for the establishment of orbital systems and carbon based life. Many anthropic coincidences have been discovered by scientists, leading to discussions of underlying philosophical and religious ideas (Sommerville 2006, 80).

Because science is so often accepted or rejected as a matter of faith, Sommerville finds a sort of science fiction being adopted on campuses. Rather than psychic phenomena, he identifies these fictions based on physics (Sommerville 2006, 81). That which is invisible is taken to be entirely real and therefore as a realm demanding exploration.

The whole matter of anthropic coincidence suggests strong religious undercurrents, which Sommerville ties to a defensive attitude among secular scientists. It runs counter to the assumptions of naturalism (Sommerville 2006, 82) Human existence and thought is special. It points to invisible and non-concrete elements which do not allow for scientific exploration. Proof fits the realm of science, but not the realm of religion (Sommerville 2006, 83). Sommerville sees in this a call for the philosophical and religious questions to play a greater role in the discourse in academia. Without those questions, the presuppositions of naturalistic secularism will continue to draw the academy away from society as a whole (Sommerville 2006, 84).

It's Hard to Evaluate Something You Can't Define

12/5/2018

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
12/5/18
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 5, “Trouble Judging Religions” pp. 61-73

Sommerville has previously demonstrated that religious thought of one kind or another is of great importance to humanity. He observes that at times academia has tried to deny this or embrace it, but that making reasoned judgments about religious claims is very difficult in the academy (Sommerville 2006, 61). The difficulties are compounded by the fact that religions disagree with one another. Therefore it bcomes necessary to weight the claims of various religions (Sommerville 2006, 62). Furthermore, adherents to different religions are an important mark of the religion in practice, though their behavior may or may not reflect the religion’s doctrines or tenets accurately. Even within adherents of one religion there may be vastly different ways of living out the religion (Sommerville 2006, 63). Sommerville further observes that in much of academia religious thought is ignored or ridiculed.

Sommerville observes “that a religion can be judged only on the basis of another religion (Sommerville 2006, 63). This is unsettling specifically because it forces one to formulate creedal statements which draw one’s own religious views as superior to others. Because of this tendency to elevate our own religion, we may look for a scientific or ethical, rather than a religious, reason to affirm one way of life (Sommerville 2006, 64).

Finding a nonreligious basis for belief is problematic. Sommerville observes that “intelligence is built on beliefs. . . Belief amounts to the assumptions, the prereflectve commitments, that lie beneath our thinking (Sommerville 2006, 64). For instance, scientific inquiry in the West is built on a presupposition that nature is essentially regular. The presupposition is a statement of faith. Evaluating the consistency of our presuppositions is one of the tasks academics must engage in. Yet Sommerville finds it a very difficult task for the academy.

We may assume that a religion or religious studies department would be at the forefront of evaluating religious claims. However, Sommerville observes that these departments prefer to take an objective approach, looking at religion from outside (Sommerville 2006, 67). In contrast to the objective view of a religion, Sommerville suggests a genuine seighing of actions and creeds. For instance, many of the common objections to Christianity speak against historical events seen by many as sinful. He mentions, among others, religious wars, persecution, slavery, racism, and the like. Bu why are these recognized as wrong? Who told us that they are violations? “The criticisms [of religion] were religious in their origin” (Sommerville 2006, 69). Sommerville points out that ethics are relative by nature, as they are built on different philosophical presuppositions. “In short, we judge other religions on the basis of our own religion. Indeed, we discover what our actual religion is by the judgments we render” (Sommerville 2006, 70). Our judgments will differ form those of others based n the presuppositions used. In the end, all our policy becomes a religious decision.

Sommerville maintains that the academy cannot adequately define what religion is, not to mention making an attempt to weigh religious claims (Sommerville 2006, 71). Because academics insist on objectifying religion, they can never expect to make adequate evaluations of it. It is clear that religions differ from one another, but academics are not well prepared to say how or why it would matter (Sommerville 2006, 73).

It's Tough to Eliminate Religion

11/28/2018

Wednesdays are for Bits and Pieces
11/28/18
Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 4 “Trouble Eliminating Religion” pp. 47-59.

Sommerville points to educational challenges which relate to secularism, a removal of religion from all disciplines. However, he has not yet clarified what he means by “religion.” In Summerville’s paradigm it is not a system of creeds and dogmas. Those are normally present in religion, but Sommerville takes religion to be broader than that. He includes the idea of the traditional intellectual virtues to be included in religion. There may be numerous different religiously held philosophical points of view in academia. Not all are clearly religious sects (Sommerville 2006, 47). Sommerville treats as religious those questions which “elicit one’s ultimate concerns and commitments” (Sommerville 2006, 48). Because these are important questions they deserve exploration. However, he finds they are merely dismissed by academia, eve though many of the important trends in Western thought can be traced to religious, and often distinctly Christian, roots. Because so many ideas in the academic traditions are derived from Christianity, Sommerville suggests it would not be harmful to allow Christianity to speak in the academy.

Sommerville notes the alarm with which this idea is received. This alarm is often based on the fact that Christianity still thinks it has answers for this day, as opposed to being simply historically useful (Sommerville 2006, 49). Sommerville points out that while Christianity is not very helpful in developing data points and proof of events, it can b very illuminating as we try to interpret the significance of the evidence. This is the bulk of the work in many areas of academia (Sommerville 2006, 50). For the most part, the university population is pursuing disciplines which seek the human good. Therefore, they often work outside the realm of definitive proof. This allows room for debate about what human good actually is.

Religion, then, stands apart from secularism. Yet as we pursue a secular naturalism, we find less room “to express human values” (Sommerville 2006, 51). These expressions of human values are still needed and commonly used. Sommerville fears that removing those values from academia will simply drive more of a wedge between the academy and common life. Rather, he would like to see more of the diversity which is found by open discussion of ethical and value-laden topics. Sommerville further finds that Christians have typically been willing to discuss these issues with secularists but that the secularists have not been willing (Sommerville 2006, 52). Sommerville goes on to discuss the objections of postmodern pioneer Stanley Fish, who found secularists too closed-minded toward historic religions (Sommerville 2006, 52ff). Fish’s analysis concluded that the secularists were committed to analysis which discounts all traditional authority, while the Christians viewed traditional authority as something valuable and profitable (Sommerville 2006, 54). In sharp contrast to this pattern, Sommerville cites John Stuart Mill, who was a staunch secularist, but who urged education for training the will in moral and religious values (Sommerville 2006, 55).

Because humans continue to think and speak in terms of values and morals, Sommerville concludes that there is an important role for religion in our research and discourse about the sciences and humanities (Sommerville 2006, 56). In history, the religious or moral value which has often held intellectual discourse together has been a concept of honor. “Honor depends on pride and class prejudice, being the focal point of a self-regarding value system. Scientists had to invest honor with an importance that makes strange reading today. It served its purpose in guaranteeing and enforcing scholarly standards when they were new and unfamiliar” (Sommerville 2006, 57). The codes of honor which could protect truth claims and prevent fabrication of evidence were very helpful in terms of guarding academic integrity, at least for some time. Sommerville suggests that the condes of honor may have been replaced, at least partly, by the assumption that intelligent people will abandon religious faith at an early age, then teach others to do so (Sommerville 2006, 57). This leaves a strong impression that religion is childish and useless. It also actively discourages teachers of religion from urging young people to pursue challenging intellectual topics (Sommerville 2006, 58). This weakens both the religious organization adn the academy.

Is There a Gulf between Facts and Values?

11/21/2018

Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 3 “Trouble Maintaining the Fact/Value Dichotomy” pp. 39-46.

Sommerville identifies the dichotomy expected in academia between facts and values. This arose by the 1920s in much philosophy. “It held that we are not supposed to be able to derive a value from a fact, or an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’” (Sommerville 2006, 39). The dichotomy, normally seen as an essential exaltation of scientism, is now being eroded by some philosophers. Sommerville notes that theology and philosophy have historically been in dialog with the sciences to identify core values (Sommerville 2006, 40). The dichotomy arose in the United States as professors in the early 20th century saw that avoiding statements of moral values would also avoid some social pressures (Sommerville 2006, 40). By the time of postmodernism the dichotomy also became of use to the religious community. They would be protected in the ability to assert values which had no relationship to facts.

Nearer the end of the 20th century, religious and philosophical scholars began again to observe that facts are loaded with theoretical and thus value-based concepts (Sommerville 2006, 41). All, or at least almost all, scientific research and interpretation is ultimately based on a value judgment.

In a similar way, values are subject to facts. “Objective value comes from the criticism of our valuations, just as science comes from criticism of observations” (Sommerville 2006, 42). This implies that values are not sobuective, as they are considered in relationship to other values. In fact, the concept of knowledge itself is a value, built on evaluation of various alternatives. There’s a sense in which scientists choose what stream of data to pursue based on a stated or unstated value assessment (Sommerville 2006, 43).

Sommerville does not, considering the similarity of science and religion as disciplines which evaluate different data streams to consider their validity, either science or religion can be invalidated due to a wrong focus in our research. They can also enter into discussions which appear utterly useless to those outside of their disciplies (Sommerville 2006, 44).

The dichotomy between facts and values has limited what a university can do. It strips academia of the ability to address the truly difficult questions which are common to all humanity. If something is merely subjective it has been dismissed from serious discussion. This is harmful to all of society (Sommerville 2006, 45).

What Is Human, Anyway?

11/14/2018

Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 2, “Trouble Defining the Human” pp. 23-38.

Sommerville calls out an important indicator of institutional decline with the thesis statement for this chapter. “If there is one thing that should raise the question of the secular university’s irrelevance, it might especially be in the failure to justify or even make sense of the concept of the human” (Sommerville 2006, 23). Normal observation of human work, accomplishments, and concerns indicates that we are set apart in many ways from the rest of the natural world. Sommerville observes that the limitations scientists place on experimentation shows that they consider humans to deserve a moral dignity (Sommerville 2006, 24). However, secularism erodes any reason behind a special, positive treatment of humans. Therefore, scientists who are naturalists are unable to explain why it might be appropriate to treat one or another species, habitat, or other issue in a different way from others, a behavior which Sommerville observes is engaged in by humans (Sommerville 2006, 25). Although humans are part of nature, it seems clear that we are set aside from the rest of nature. The essential question about us is “about the meanings we can give to the human, what an ideal of humanity might be, or what we could aim at” (Sommerville 2006, 27). The ideals may be classified in philosophical or religious terms, but cannot be reduced to secularity. Sommerville considers the descriptions which are purely secular to fall short (Sommerville 2006, 28). Yet if the answer involves religion, the secularism rejects it out of hand. Sommerville goes on to illustrate this phenomenon in terms of the animal rights debate. The matter of animal rights is predicated on a concept of human moral obligation. That moral obligation does not exist in the other animals (Sommerville 2006, 30).

Because these difficult questions are best answered in terms of a religious formulation, Sommerville suggests it would be helpful to “reopen our universities to a wider philosophical and cultural heritage (Sommerville 2006, 31). The attempts at naturalistic explanation have always failed. An assumption of purpose and probably creation is necessary to our understanding of what it means to be human. This has been removed from the discussion in academia (Sommerville 2006, 32).

Sommerville observes that the topics which are immediately dismissed in academia are those which require religious answers of some sort. He suggests this is “a sign of timidity rather than of assurance” (Sommerville 2006, 33). The questions for which some kind of faith is required for an answer are removed from discussion. Yet those questions underlie nearly everything we do in our lives. Sommerville gives numerous examples of problems involving the actual nature of morality, conscience, truth, and other concepts. None can be discussed with any clarity apart from a religious explanation of some sort.

One of the most telling factors in Sommerville’s discussion is the matter of discussion itself. The material elements may be made up of things which can be analyzed through breaking them into component parts and data points. But moral concepts finally defy such analysis. They are understood through the process of narrative, which in turn cannot be quantified and analyzed so easily (Sommerville 2006, 36-37). Now, with that realization, history and social sciences are using narrative approaches, as has hard science for many generations (Sommerville 2006, 37). Discovery is a process which must be described. This is a moral, philosophical, and religious process at its heart.

How are American Universities Marginalized?

11/7/2018

Sommerville, C. John. The Decline of the Secular University. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chapter 1, “The Marginalization of Our Universities” pp. 3-22.

Sommerville begins his book with a very interesting question. He asks in what way Universities are marginalized. He goes on to consider that in many aspects they are not leading forces. For instance, while the academy leans politically to the left, society is moving to the right. The interests of the academy are increasingly separate from those of the culture as a whole. It appears that universities are becoming isolated from the world, rather than leading the world (Sommerville 2006, 3). While in Europe the academy has a secular worldview which is reflected in the society, in the United States the secular academy is often countered by a religious culture which wins elections. Sommerville suggests that the university is “increasingly marginal to American society” as “a result of its secularism” (Sommerville 2006, 4). The questions our society has may be too religious for the secular academy. Sommerville goes on to list numerous sample questions which the academy appears poorly equipped to answer (Sommerville 2006, 4-5). Sommerville further observes that he is thinking of not only the elite colleges, which many see as out of touch. Most students attend average colleges, which he thinks are also detached from the world of normalcy (Sommerville 2006, 6).

Sommerville associates the decline of the unviersity with what he calls a “postsecular” worldview, “in which cultural fashion has replaced intellectual argument” (Sommerville 2006, 6). This cultural fashion is able to change quickly and cannot be argued for or against using the methods of rationalism. He compares the climate to that of the early twentieth century and finds significant differences. A hundred years ago the emphasis was placed on an information and technical base needed to participate in the current world. Now, however, the degree is intended to enable people to participate in society. However, in the early 20th century there was an assumption that civic character was based on an understanding of certain cultural values. Sommerville thinks this element of philosophy is now absent. The reason he gives is that the secular university of the 1900s sought to replace religious thought with liberal arts and humanities. The professors would replace religious experts. However, the liberal arts education has become less robust and the faculty have not been able to guide students using the methods imagined (Sommerville 2006, 8).

Sommerville considers the arcane topics of academic seminars, noting that the average person, whose tax dollars fund higher education, would find incomprehensible and useless. He also notes the increasing specialization of departments and academic units. The growth of subspecialties means that a broad education is less and less available (Sommerville 2006, 9). Further, with the explosion of information there has been a decreasing emphasis on wisdom and context. Because academics can’t or won’t pursue wise decisions, the public increasingly ignores them. Worst of all, Sommerville says, is that the increasing secularization hs removed some of the important moral and philosophical reference points needed to have a reasoned discussion (Sommerville 2006, 10). Despite Sommerville’s recognition that secularization has pushed religion to the side in culture, politics, and academics, his book will focus on the negative effect of secularization on academia, not on religion (Sommerville 2006, 11).

Sommerville makes it clear that the term “secularization” merely indicates “the separation of religion from various aspects of life and of thought” (Sommerville 2006, 11). For this reason, secularization can be carried on by a highly religious person who keeps those religious views out of sight in certain contexts. Counter to this, “secularism” seeks “to complete and enforce secularization” (Sommerville 2006, 11). This would attempt to force religion out of life entirely.

As the academy tended to move toward secularism, particiularly in the sciences, it found itself unable to answer questions of values, interests, or of the importance of cultures (Sommerville 2006, 13). It may be important to step back out of secularism, though still allowing for secularization on some levels. The secularism may hve deprived us of language and thought patterns needed to express and analyze worldviews (Sommerville 2006, 14). At the same time, Sommerville thinks secularism is becoming more muddled and difficult to defend. This may well be because it is also an ideology (Sommerville 2006, 15).

Sommerville observes that the 19th century saw a move in academia from a fairly ingrained assumption of religious value to more of an interest in religion as an academic point of view (Sommerville 2006, 15-16). At the same time, science took the position of greatest authority. During the 20th century, the idea of a religious morality was gradually turned into a study of ethics, then eventually it lost its religious tone altogether (Sommerville 2006, 17). The academic world became more distant from questions of religion, even during times of religious revival. It became more entrenched in secularism.

The idea of intellectual discourse also endured change, especially in the 20th century. Sommerville observes that a “marketplace of ideas” means something very different today than it did around 1900 (Sommerville 2006, 19). In 1900 the work of scholarship was routinely published in a few journals. It used proofs and logical argumentation. It was possible to interact with scholarly work from various disciplines. With the explosion of publishing it became more difficult to sort through the many arguments. As a result, Sommerville finds a greater emphasis on tolerance and diversity as opposed to proofs based on logical use of data (Sommerville 2006, 19). Sommerville does not show clearly how this outcome would occur. He does speak of a democratization of ideas and opinions (Sommerville 2006, 19) which may be the source of the shift. If all opinions are of equal value, regardless of the evidence, the majority gets to decide what truth is. If they agree that truth is different for different people, then suddenly everyone is right, regardless of data and logical analysis.

He does make a connection between postmodernism and the move from fact to fashion. This could easily lead to an academic culture in which any opinion is authoritative (Sommerville 2006, 20). In the end, students are left to themselves when it is time to work with the most difficult questions of values and morality. The modern view of scholarship does not have the tools to do so. Sommerville says this is due to the constraints of secularism (Sommerville 2006, 21).