Category: Aristotle - Wittenberg Door Campus Ministry

Effective Interrogation

5/13/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 5/13/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 18.

Aristotle turns his attention in III.18 to the interrogation. When an opponent has shown a weakness in answer to a question, pushing more with questions may make the opponent seem absurd (Aristotle III.18, B. 1418b). It is also a use of interrogation to see the opponent’s concession to a premise and then to state the conclusion against him (Aristotle III.18, B. 1419a). This is similar to the practice of showing from an opponent that he actually disagrees with a nearly universal concept, or stopping the opponent from equivocation (Aristotle III.18, B. 1419a). It is also possible to dismantle a serious argument by turning it into a joke (Aristotle III.18, B. 1419b). Particularly observation of irony may be very effective.

Wrapping It Up

5/13/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 5/13/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 19.

In this last chapter of Aristotle’s Rhetoric he addresses the epilogue of a speech. “The Epilogue has four parts. You must (1) make the audience well-disposed towards yourself and ill-disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required state of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories” (Aristotle III.19, B. 1419b). These activities should be kept in order as each one flows from the last. In the final stage, Aristotle says repetition is called for, while it was not appropriate in the earlier stage of introduction or development (Aristotle III.19, B. 1420a). Finally, Aristotle says the conclusion is a place for “the disconnected style of language” (Aristotle III.19, B. 1420b) - use of short and forceful sentences which demand a response.

The Right Argument

5/6/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 5/6/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 17.

Aristotle addresses the use of arguments, saying that their duty is to attempt proof. “These proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads. (1) If you maintain that the act was not committed, your main task in court is to prove this. (2) If you maintain that the act did no harm, prove this. If you maintain that (3) the act was less than is alleged, or (4) justified, prove these facts, just as you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that” (Aristotle III.17, B. 1417b). A ceremonial speech will normally argue that a deed is noble and useful. A political speech may argue impracticability or injustice (Aristotle III.17, B. 1418a). While Aristotle considers examples appropriate in political discussion, enthymemes are better for forensic debate (Aristotle III.17, B. 1418a). Yet enthymemes must be broken up by narration and maxims.

Aristotle identifies political oratory as challenging due to its focus on the future rather than the past (Aristotle III.17, B. 1418a). Proofs and moral discourse will prove adequate in most positive cases, while enthymeme is more useful in refutation than in positive proofs (Aristotle III.17, B. 1418b).

Storytelling and Evidence

4/29/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 4/29/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 16.

In book 3 chapter 16 Aristotle turns his attention to narration, which he says must be intermittent, in order to prevent the hearers from losing track of the case at hand (Aristotle III.16, B. 1416b). The orator should present some evidence, then illustrative narrative, then additional evidence, etc. However, the narrative must fit the case and the audience (Aristotle III.16, B. 1417a). Aristotle goes on to cite various narrative samples in literature and philosophy, pointing out how each accomplishes a purpose. The narrative is decidedly in appeal to emotion (Aristotle III.6, B. 1417b). This is a positive appeal. “Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you in that light; and the same with your adversary; but do not let them see what you are about” (Aristotle III.16, B. 1417b). In this way the audience is more likely to accept your argument.

Appeals to Character

4/22/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 4/22/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 15.

To dispel prejudice, Aristotle suggests an appeal to character without specific comment on the prejudice. Alternatively, the situation may be confronted openly (Aristotle III.15, B. 1416a). The wrong may be denied outright or mitigated with other data. It is also often possible to implicate your accuser in similar wrongs. Aristotle goes on to suggest that denouncing the criticisms lodged may also be effective (Aristotle III.15, B. 1416b).

Keep the Introduction Short

4/15/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 4/15/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 14.

Aristotle comments on the similarity of the starts of different works of art (Aristotle III.14, B. 1414b). In a speech of display, the introduction is normally a “piece of praise or censure” (Aristotle III.14, B. 1415a). In a forensic speech, on the other hand, the prologue introduces the theme of the speech, rather than creating suspense (Aristotle III.14, B. 1415a). “This, then, is the most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction, to show what the aim of the speech is; and therefore no introduction ought to be employed where the subject is not long or intricate” (Aristotle III.14, B. 1415a). Aristotle reminds his reader that many different means may be appropriate to secure the agreement of the hearer (Aristotle III.14, B. 1415b). Yet since long introductions are normally used by those with weak cases, he recommends keeping the introduction relatively short (Aristotle III.14, B. 1415b).

State It and Prove It

4/8/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 4/8/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 13.

Aristotle breaks all speeches into two main parts. “You must state your case, and you must prove it. You cannot either state your case and omit to prove it, or prove it without first having stated it” (Aristotle III.13, B. 1414b). The various subdivisions made by many rhetoricians all fall into these two areas. Many variations exist in the proof portion, as other counter arguments may be brought up and refuted.

A Fitting Style

4/1/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 4/1/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 12.

Aristotle reminds the reader “that each kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style” (Aristotle III.12, B. 1413b). Writing and speech are not the same. Different oratorical settings call for different speech patterns. “The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery” (Aristotle III.12, B. 1413b). Aristotle gives several examples of statements which work in speaking but not as written text and vice versa. As to oratory, “It is ceremonial oratory that is most literary, for it is meant to be read, and next to it forensic oratory” (Aristotle III.12, B. 1414a). Aristotle will next speak of arrangement.

A Surprising Metaphor

3/25/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 3/25/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 11.

Aristotle discusses use of metaphor to create vivid descriptions. He continues in III.11 to illustrate how particularly lifelike words or phrases add force to the metaphors, citing Homeric passages (Aristotle III.11, B. 1411b). Homer often gives inanimate objects a lifelike will or desire. One reason the metaphor is effective is that the language may surprise the reader or hearer (Aristotle III.11, B. 1412b). This may be done through unexpected language or through use of homophones, which may result in a surprise (Aristotle III.11, B. 1412b). Aristotle further suggests that similes and proverbs are metaphors which have been rearranged slightly (Aristotle III.11, B. 1413a).

Vivid

3/18/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 3/18/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 10.

Aristotle now discusses creation of “lively and taking sayings” (Aristotle III.10, B. 1410b). While such creations come only with practice, some people find it easier than others to write in this way. The purpose is to use vivid language so the listener grasps an idea readily. To create sayings, Aristotle says, “we must aim at these three points: Antithesis, Metaphor, and Actuality” (Aristotle III.10, B. 1410b).

First, Metaphor that refers to a part of a whole is most effective. For instance, referring to part of a year is helpful for mental context (Aristotle III.10, B. 1411a). He gives numerous examples from noted speakers.

Punctuation in Speech

3/11/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 3/11/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 9.

Continuing his discussion of prose, Aristotle shows that it may be either largely free-flowing or repetitive in its punctuation (Aristotle III.9, B. 1409b). The free flowing type he views as less satisfactory, as it does not have the natural punctuation a hearer wants. Rather, he encourages periodic speech. “By a period I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance” (Aristotle III.9, B. 1409b). The period must express a complete idea. It may be divided into parts, but Aristotle emphasizes that it must be brief (Aristotle III.9, B. 1409b). Periods which are divided into parts may either be parallel or contrasting (Aristotle III.9, B. 1409b). He provides numerous examples, also referring the reader to a catalog in the Theodectea (Aristotle III.9,B. 1410b).

Speaking in Rhythm

3/4/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 3/4/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 8.

Regarding meter in prose, Aristotle says, “The form of a prose composition should be neither metrical nor destitute of rhythm” (Aristotle III.8, B. 1408b). If it is too clearly metered it will disrupt the listener. If there is no rhythm “the effect will be vague and unsatisfactory” (Aristotle III.8, B. 1408b). Aristotle thus recommends rhythm but not meter. The iambic rhythm is most common in speech, while Aristotle compares trochees “to wild dancing” (Aristotle III.8, B. 1408b). Instead, Aristotle urges use of the paean, “since from this alone of the rhythms mentioned no definite metre arises, and therefore is the least obtrusive of them” (Aristotle III.8, B. 1409a). He gives examples of a structure for both beginning and end of a sentence.

A Fitting Tone

2/26/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 2/26/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 7.

Aristotle discusses appropriate language in book three chapter seven. Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject” (Aristotle III.7, B. 1408a). To correspond to the subject, he says the language choices must match the subject in seriousness or levity. The result of appropriate language is an air of credibility. While the tone of communication should not always match the topic, thus seeming too much like a theatrical performance, it should generally be close, giving a genuine and unstudied air (Aristotle III.7, B. 1408b).

Creating Impressive Language

2/19/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 2/19/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 6.

In book three chapter six Aristotle proposes five methods to add impressiveness to language. First, a description rather than a name lends an expansive air. The name is more concise. Choose the name or description based on your purpose. Second, “to avoid poetical effects” use metaphors or epithets (Aristotle III.6, B. 1407b). Third, refer to something in the plural to make it more impressive (the heavens). Fourth, use of an article with each noun, even if not necessary, makes more grandiose Greek. Fifth, the use of additional connective words gives an expansive air. Finally, description of a thing by mentioning what it does not have may be of use (Aristotle III.6, B. 1408a).

Proper Language Usage Always Matters

2/12/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 2/12/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 5.

In chapter five of book three, Aristotle summarizes correct language and its role in good style. He identifies five elements (Aristotle III.5, B. 1407b). “First, the proper use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them in the natural sequence which some of them require.” “The second lies in calling things by their own special names and not by vague general ones.” “The third is to avoid ambiguities…” “A fourth rule is to observe Protagoras’ classification of nouns into male, female, and inanimate…” “A fifth rule is to express plurality, fewness, and unity by the correct wording.”

Aristotle on Similes

2/5/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 2/5/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 4.

Here Aristotle distinguishes the simile from other metaphors. A simile is a type of metaphor but using “like” or “as” in the comparison (Aristotle III.4, B. 1406b). Aristotle gives numerous examples from famous authors.

Plain Words, and Just Enough of Them

1/29/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 1/29/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 3.

In this chapter Aristotle classifies four ways that one can have bad taste in language. First, “the misuse of compound words” (Aristotle III.3, B. 1406a). Strings of compound words is almost always clumsy. “Another is the employment of strange words” (Aristotle III.3, B. 1406a). Oddity for the sake of oddity is never sustainable. “A third form is the use of long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets” (Aristotle III.3, B. 1406a). While acceptable in poetry, prose should not emphasize the epithet. Finally, “[m]etaphors like other things may be inappropriate” (Aristotle III.3, B. 1406b). They may prove ridiculous or far-fetched. This does not improve writing but distracts from its purpose.

Do It with Style

1/22/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 1/22/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 2.

Aristotle moves on to discuss appropriate style. “Style to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech means to do. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation . . . “ (Aristotle III.2, B. 1404b). A memorable speech, however, should be slightly unfamiliar in usage, since “. . . people like what strikes them, and are struck by what is out of the way” (Aristotle III.2, B. 1404b). Aristotle continues with examples of the difference between poetry and prosody. He recommends extensive use of metaphor (Aristotle III.2, B. 1405a). Again, he provides examples of meaningful metaphors.

Just the facts? Not quite.

1/15/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 1/15/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book III, chapter 1.

Aristotle turns his attention in book 3 to the expressive style of the speaker. “For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech (Aristotle III.1, B. 1403b). Delivery, however, had not been studied systematically in Aristotle’s time. He points out that, “Delivery is - very properly - not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry” (Aristotle III.1, B. 1403b). However, as rhetoric does study appearances, the subject of delivery must be addressed.

For an understanding of delivery, Aristotle is forced to return his thoughts to poetry. Though poetry and prose are very different, the presentational style of a poet is often helpful (Aristotle III.1, B. 1404a).

Wrapping up Enthymemes

1/8/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 1/8/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 26

Aristotle closes this book of his Art of Rhetoric by clarifying that Amplification and Depreciation are not classes of enthymemes. He also states that Refutative enthymemes fit in the same category as Constructive enthymemes. He will move next to deal with Style and Arrangement,having already covered invention.

Refuting Arguments

1/1/2016

Fridays are for Philosophy 1/1/16
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 25

Having introduced the genuine and apparent enthymemes, Aristotle now discusses how to refute them. “An argument may be refuted, either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection” (Aristotle II.25, B. 1402a). A contrary syllogism may be constructed by using parallel but differing ideas. An objection can be made in several ways. Aristotle first discusses attacking the opponent’s statement. By this he means pointing out an exception to a universal statement or concept (Aristotle II.25 B. 1402b). It is also possible to show that the opposite of a universal conclusion is not universal. Aristotle calls this “an objection from a contrary statement” (Aristotle II.25, B. 1402b). He then identifies the parallel “objection from a like statement” (Aristotle II.25, B. 1402b). Here the speaker observes that a parallel universal statement may not be true, therefore the opponent’s universal may also not be true.

Aristotle reminds the reader that an enthymeme is based on probability, an example, an infallible sign, or an ordinary sign (Aristotle II.75, B. 1402b). An argument from probability can often be overturned. One from a fallible sign can always be refuted. An argument based on example is susceptible to a counter example. One from an infallible sign cannot be overcome unless it contains a logical fallacy (Aristotle II.25, B. 1403a).

Faulty Conclusions

12/25/2015

Fridays are for Philosophy 12/25/15
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 24.

Aristotle shows that there are enthymemes which are not genuine. It is quite possible to make a conclusive statement which is not based on any evidence given (Aristotle II.24, B. 1401a). Words may also be redefined so as to assert a false conclusion (Aristotle II.24, B. 1401a). It is also possible to assert of a whole what is true of its parts. This is another fallacy, as a whole and its parts might not be identical (Aristotle II.24, B. 1401a). Another common false argument is accomplished, “if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant’s guilt (Aristotle II.24, B. 401b). Again, it is possible to attempt to generalize from one event, an accident, a consequence, or an alleged but not real cause (Aristotle II.24, B. 1401b). Avoiding mention of time or situation may serve to adduce a false conclusion (Aristotle II.24, B. 1402a).

Prove It Or Disprove It!

12/18/2015

Fridays are for Philosophy 12/18/15
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 23.

Aristotle now begins to discuss ways of proving or disproving an argument. He begins by pointing out that opposites must be truly opposites for a proof to work. For example, “Temperence is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful” (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1397a). If in fact one part of the statement is false, the other likely is as well. A second proof would be by means of considering all possible meanings of key words. Because of semantic range, some arguments may be overturned. There are also some situations in which an action may not be appropriate or one can be shown to be appropriate based on the other. For instance, if it is not inappropriate for one person to pay taxes, it is all right to collect the taxes (Aristotle 2:23, B. 1397b). An a fortiori argument says that if the less likely condition is true the more likely one will be also (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1397b). Some arguments can work based on time. If an action was allowed at one time it may be expected at another time (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1398a). In a debate, if it is possible to get the opponent to admit to what he says is disallowed in you it is normally positive (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1398a). Defining terms carefully can lead to a successful argument based on the defined terms (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1398a). An inductive argument may also indicate that conditions were right for a certain argument (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1398b). An argument from precedent is often viable (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1399a). Refutation or proof of separate parts of an argument is also quite effective (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1399a). Consequences of an action may be used to indicate whether it is wise or not. Related to this idea, showing that similar results come from sinister causes is often effective (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1399b). Aristotle also endorses arguments based on motives, rather than fact (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1399b). Argument based on incredible events or contradictions may be easily refuted (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1400a). Comparing actions or past history often prove useful in argumentation (Aristotle 2.23, B. 1400b).

What's an Enthymeme?

12/11/2015

Fridays are for Philosophy 12/11/15
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 22.

After having spent considerable time working with different elements of an argument, Aristotle begins to discuss Enthymemes, previously introduced as syllogisms. Aristotle urges the speaker to avoid making obscure arguments. Simplicity is almost always more accepted (Aristotle II.22, B. 1395b). “The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue” (Aristotle II.22, B. 1396a). Facts which are specific to a case are superior to generalizations.

Aristotle then moves into classes of enthymemes, which he considers first to be either those which prove or those which disprove a proposition (Aristotle II.22, B. 1396b). “The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative, by the conjunction of incompatible propositions” (Aristotle II.22, B. 1396b).

What Is a Maxim?

12/4/2015

Fridays are for Philosophy 12/4/15
Aristotle, and W. Rhys Roberts. Rhetoric. Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004. Kindle Electronic Edition.
Book II, chapter 21.

Aristotle now considers Maxims. A maxim is a general statement about practical conduct. In general, the premise in an enthymeme is a maxim (Aristotle II.21, B. 1394a). Aristotle identifies four types of maxims. Some need a supplement as proof and some do not. Some which have a supplement are part of an enthymeme (Aristotle II.21, B. 1394b). “The use of Maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced (Aristotle II.21, B. 1395a).